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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Appellant/Petitioner,
:

Case No. 20040289-SC

v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Warden,
Appellee/Respondent

:

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION A N D NATURE OF T H E PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Menzies appeals the denial of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief from the judgment denying
post-conviction relief from his capital murder conviction and death sentence. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(i) (West 2004).
ISSUE STATEMENTS AND REVIEW STANDARDS
1. In T.S. v. State, 82 P.3d 1104, 2003 UT 54, where the Court recognized a statutory
right to the effective assistance of appointed counsel in parental termination cases, this Court
held that a party's negligent and intentional acts may make it inequitable to grant relief even if
the party proves that his appointed counsel was ineffective. If T.S. applies to this case, did the
rule 60(b) court properly deny relief from the post-conviction judgment based on its finding that
Mr. Menzies' intentional and negligent acts barred relief?
2. Should the Court affirm on the alternative bases that: 1) the Court should not

recognize a statutory right to the effective assistance of capital post-conviction counsel; and 2)
if the Court does recognize such a right, Mr. Menzies never proved that it was violated?
3. May a client rely on his counsel's deficient performance to demonstrate "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" justifying relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)?
Alternatively, did Mr. Menzies timely seek rule 60(b)(1) relief or prove that he had any
meritorious claims?
4. Did Mr. Menzies prove a due process violation that deprived the post-conviction
court of the authority to deny post-conviction relief?
5. Does a final judgment with no executory features have "prospective application"?
Has Mr. Menzies identified any new developments that make it inequitable to leave the judgment
in place?
6. If the Court does reverse the denial of rule 60(b) relief, does equity require starting
from the beginning a ten-year-old case collaterally reviewing a seventeen-year-old conviction and
sentence for a nearly twenty-year-old murder?
The first six issues challenge the denial of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief from the postconviction judgment. The rule 60(b) court had broad discretion to decide whether to set aside
the judgment This Court may reverse that decision only if the court abused its broad decision.
See, e.g., Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 2000 UT 751ffl9-l0. Mr. Menzies did not preserve many of
his appellate arguments. He may succeed on those arguments only if he establishes plain error.
See, e.g., State v. Kelt, 61 P.3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 f32; State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74
ffijll-19; State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 403-405 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).

2

7. Should the rule 60(b) court have ordered respondent to shred documents that
respondent did not obtain from Mr. Menzies?
Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding discovery issues, and this Court will reverse
only if the trial court abused it. Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 2001 UT 62 ^[2.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Addendum A contains United States Constitution Amendment 6; Utah Code Ann. 7835a-202 (West 2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 8 and 12; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Utah R Evid. 201; and
Utah Administrative Code 25-14-6.
CASE STATEMENT 1
Criminal proceedings
Some time before 10:00 p.m. on February 23,1986, Ms. Maurine Hunsaker disappeared
from the service station where she worked. On February 25,1986, a hiker found her body at
Storm Mountain picnic area. She had been strangled and her throat had been cut. See generally
State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393,396 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); GT. 1009-1012.
The State charged Mr. Menzies with Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Id. at 397. The trial lasted
one month and concluded more than two years after the murder. Id.; Crim.R. 1096.
At trial, the State proved, among other things, that Troy Denter loaned his car to Mr.
Menzies at approximately 8:00 p.m. the night Ms. Hunsaker disappeared. Mr. Menzies asked
to borrow it until approximately 10:00 p.m. When Mr. Denter called Mr. Menzies' apartment

x

The criminal case record and transcripts have not been separately numbered for this
appeal. Respondent will refer to the criminal record numbers at "CrimR." Respondent will
refer to the criminal transcripts by date and page number.
3

at approximately 11:00 p.m. to ask about the car, Mr. Menzies' girlfriend, Nicole Arnold, said
that Mr. Menzies was not there. When Mr. Denter contacted Mr. Menzies at approximately 1:00
a.m., Mr. Menzies asked to keep the car until the following day because "he just had one more
order of business to take care of;" Mr. Menzies returned the car at approximately noon. (2/2324/88 transcript at 1397-1402,1409.)
The morning after Ms. Hunsaker disappeared, a witness saw at Storm Mountain a car
similar to Mr. Denter's, a woman wearing clothes similar to those found on Ms. Hunsaker's
body, and a man with the woman who looked like Mr. Menzies and wore a maroon and grey
parka similar to his (2/18-19/88 transcript at 1193-98,1201-1213,1270,1284-86; 2/23-24/88
transcript at 1332-38,1394; 2/25-26/88 transcript at 1685).2 Police found a cigarette butt at the
crime scene that tested positive for an enzyme common to Mr. Menzies, Ms. Hunsaker, and
thirty-six percent of the population (3/1-2/88 transcript at 1991-93).3 The medical examiner
concluded that knives later identified as Mr, Menzies5 could have caused the neck wounds that
Ms. Hunsaker suffered (2/25-26/88, transcript at 1610-15). Ms. Hunsaker had marks on her
wrists consistent with having been handcuffed and pulled by the wrists; Ms. Arnold's mother
found handcuffs in Mr. Menzies' maroon and grey parka, and Troy Denter found a box labeled

2

The witness provided police with a description within one inch in height and ten
pounds in weight of Mr. Menzies. He accurately described Mr. Menzies' hair, facial hair, and
glasses. He helped create a composite drawing so accurate that detectives included Mr.
Menzies' photograph as one of three from among two hundred jail inmates that matched the
composite. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 401.
3

Respondent moved to release the cigarette butt to the state crime lab to evaluate
whether it could be tested for DNA, and, if so, to test the butt for DNA (R. 4138). Mr.
Menzies opposed the motion (R. 4144).
4

"handcuffs" under the seat of his car (2/23-24/88, transcript at 1404-1405,1482).
The day after Ms. Hunsaker disappeared and the day before the hiker found her body,
police arrested Mr. Menzies on an unrelated charge. During the booking process, Mr. Menzies
ran to a changing room in the jail, where jail personnel found four of Ms. Hunsaker's
identification cards (2/23-24/88 transcript at 1519-22,1548-52,1561-63,1566,1572-74; 2/2526/88 transcript at 1731-32). Mr. Menzies telephoned Mr. Denter from jail and asked him to
retrieve $115 from Mr. Menzies' apartment to buy some things for Ms. Arnold. Mr. Denter
spent approximately $25 from the $115. Police later seized $90 in cash from Mr. Menzies'
apartment. An accounting revealed that approximately $116 was missing from the station.
(2/18-19/88 transcript at 1178; 2/23-24/88, transcript at 1423-24,1477; 2/25-26/88 transcript
at 1745-47.)
Chemical analysis and microscopic examination demonstrated that green shag carpet
fibers found on Ms. Hunsaker's clothing were similar to green shag carpet from Mr. Menzies'
apartment (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1688-90, 1892; 3/1-2/88 transcript at 1965-74). Ms.
Arnold's step-father found Ms. Hunsaker's social security card in Ms. Arnold's belongings
(2/23-24/88, transcript at 1498, 1506-1508). Police seized from Mr. Menzies' apartment Ms.
Hunsaker's brown suede purse with a broken strap (2/18-19/88 transcript at 989-90; 2/2526/88 transcript at 1743). Police found Ms. Hunsaker's thumb print on the passenger window
of the car that Mr. Menzies borrowed from Mr. Denter (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1779,178788).
The jury heard Mr. Walter Britton's preliminary hearing testimony recounting Mr.

5

Menzies' admission that he murdered Ms. Hunsaker. (3/1-2/88, transcript at 2080-85.) The jury
also heard Mr. Menzies' story about picking up a young woman and driving around until they
got stuck in the mud (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1876-77,1880).
The jury convicted Mr. Menzies of capital murder. At the penalty phase, the State, in
addition to the circumstances of Ms. Hunsaker's murder, put on aggravating evidence that
detailed Mr. Menzies extensive criminal history, which included three armed robberies (in one,
Mr. Menzies nearly blew off his victim's arm with a shotgun) and a prison escape. Mr. Menzies'
trial counsel put on mental health mitigation evidence from two experts; family history evidence
from Mr. Menzies' sister and aunt, detailing the abuse that Mr. Menzies suffered; testimony
establishing Mr. Menzies' relative good behavior on his previous incarceration; and evidence
from a former parole board member that, if sentenced to life, Mr. Menzies likely would spend
the rest of his life in prison. (3/15-16/88; 3/17,18, 23/88; and 3/16/88 transcripts.)
Mr. Menzies' direct appeal lasted another seven years, concluding nine years after the
murder. It generated two opinions. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 396 (Utah 1994), cert, denied,
513 U.S. 1115 (1995); State v. Menkes, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992).
Post-conviction proceedings.
Beginning in April 1995, Mr. Menzies filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and/or Post Conviction Relief (R. 1), an amended petition (R. 44), and a second amended
petition (R. 1231). In all, the petitions raised seventy-three claims for post-conviction relief.
The seventy-second raised seven separate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
From 1995 until 1998, four pro bono attorneys represented Mr. Menzies (R. 36,41). In

6

1998, after the state legislature provided funding for representation and expenses in capital postconviction cases, the post-conviction court appointed Edward Brass to represent Mr. Menzies
(R. 1215).
On February 2, 1999, the post-conviction court dismissed the first seventy-one claims.
The court found that they were procedurally barred because Mr. Menzies had raised and lost
them on direct appeal. (R. 1705 (addendum B).)
Throughout the seven years of post-conviction litigation, Mr. Menzies provided no
discovery without respondent having to file motions to compel and, at times, motions for
sanctions. It took three tries and two motions to compel to complete Mr. Menzies' deposition.
After repeated failures to comply with the orders compelling discovery, the post-conviction
court entered sanctions that precluded Mr. Menzies from introducing any evidence supporting
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims beyond that disclosed in his discovery answers to that
point and what was in the underlying criminal case record. (R. 1968,2093-2102 (addendum C).)
Respondent then moved for summary judgment (R. 2110). Mr. Menzies did not respond.
Nevertheless, the post-conviction court analyzed the remaining claims and denied them on their
merits.4 On January 11, 2002, the post-conviction court entered final judgment denying postconviction relief. (R. 2237-61 (addendum D).)5

4

On some claims, the post-conviction court made alternative procedural bar rulings.

t h r o u g h o u t his brief, Mr. Menzies refers to the sanctions order and summary
judgment as "default" orders. The label inaccurately suggests that the post-conviction court
granted the sanctions and summary judgment motions because Mr. Brass filed no response.
Although Mr. Menzies opposed neither motion, the post-conviction court analyzed and rule
on the merits of both motions.
7

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) proceedings.
On April 11,2002, Mr. Menzies filed a two-sentence pleading denominated a motion to
set aside judgment. The pleading indicated that he would state the "specific grounds" for the
motion "in a subsequent memorandum.5' (R. 2271 (addendum E).)
Although Mr. Menzies timely appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, he never filed
his brief. This Court dismissed the appeal for his failure to do so. Throughout the entire ten
months that the aborted appeal was pending, Mr. Menzies did not file any rule 60(b)
memorandum and did nothing else to prosecute the motion to set aside the judgment.6
Mr. Menzies waited until August 2003 to file a memorandum that purported to be in
support of the two-sentence April 2002 pleading (R. 2322).
After seven more months of litigation, which included an evidentiary hearing, the rule
60(b) court denied relief (R 3701). Mr. Menzies timely appealed (R. 3913).

6

Mr. Menzies asserts that respondent "did not move to strike or seek a hearing on or
otherwise resolve its motion to file late response (R. 2957). [Respondent] later claimed that
Menzies' time to file for relief in federal court had run in June of 2003 (R. 2363)."
Appellant's Brief at 4-5. The recitation distorts the facts to create a false impression that
respondent somehow created a federal time-bar trap for him. Other than an unexplained
record citation, Mr. Menzies fails to disclose that respondent repeatedly warned Mr. Brass
and Mr. Menzies' present counsel that respondent believed the federal limitations periods
were running. Those warnings commenced four months before the six-month limitations
statute ran and ten months before the twelve-month statute ran. Far from creating a trap for
Mr. Menzies, respondent's counsel went well beyond his ethical obligations to warn Mr.
Menzies of the federal time-bar. (R. 2363, 4124 at 35-37, 57.) Moreover, respondent
asserted in August 2003 that only one of two potentially applicable federal statutes had run,
but also acknowledged that the other would not run for another four months. Mr. Menzies
fails to disclose that respondent later declined to assert a defense based on the statute that
ran in June 2003. Menkes v. Gakkta, case no. 2:03CV00902JC/KBM, Docket No. 8
(respondent asks the Court to take judicial notice of this filed pleading pursuant to Utah R.
Evid. 201.)
8

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
I. T.S. v. State, precludes relief based on the violation of a state statutory right to the
effective assistance of counsel when the client's negligent or intentional acts would make relief
inequitable. The rule 60(b) court applied that principle to deny Mr. Menzies relief. If Mr.
Menzies had a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, Mr. Menzies has not
demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court abused its discretion by correctly applying this Court's
limitations on such a right. Mr. Menzies argues, in part, that the rule 60(b) court should not have
applied that part of the T.S. reasoning. He did not make that argument to the rule 60(b) court,
limiting this Court to a plain error review. Mr. Menzies has not acknowledge or argued the plain
error standard. His authority does not demonstrate plain error.
Mr. Menzies also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the rule 60(b)
court's findings. Again, he did not make this argument below. Again, he has not argued or
demonstrated plain error. In addition, he has not marshaled the evidence or demonstrated that
the unchallenged evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings.
II. Alternatively, the Court may affirm because the rule 60(b) court should not have
applied T.S. to this case. Applying T.S. would render capital post-conviction cases interminable:
each time a capital petitioner failed to succeed, he would file a new petition claiming ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. The legislature did not intend to cause a de facto
repeal of the death penalty by providing compensated counsel in capital post-conviction cases.
The Court may also affirm because Mr. Menzies never proved that his post-conviction
counsel was ineffective. Mr. Menzies has never proven or even attempted to prove prejudice.
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III. Mr. Menzies argues that the rule 60(b) court should have granted him relief under
rule 60(b)(1) based on his post-conviction counsel's negligence. Controlling precedent holds the
contrary. Alternatively, Mr. Menzies did not seek rule 60(b)(1) relief timely. Because he stated
no grounds for relief until nineteen months after the post-conviction judgment against him, he
filed no "motion" to set that judgment aside until that time. The motion was sixteen months
too late for rule 60(b)(1) relief. The Court may also affirm because Mr. Menzies never proved
that he had a meritorious post-conviction claim.
IV. Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a "void" judgment. A due process violation
renders a judgment "void" only when it deprives the court of the power to enter the judgment.
The rule 60(b) court correctly concluded that Mr. Brass's deficient performance did not meet
that standard and that Mr. Menzies established no other defect that would meet it.
V. Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a judgment when: 1) it has prospective application;
and 2) post-judgment events render the prospective application inequitable. Mr. Menzies has
not demonstrated that the final post-conviction judgment applies prospectively: nothing about
the post-conviction judgment remains executory or requires continued supervision by the postconviction court. In addition, he identifies no post-judgment facts that make the judgment's
terms unfair.
VI. If the Court grants relief, the Court should limit it to setting aside the summary
judgment and discovery sanctions orders. Rule 60(b) permits setting aside a judgment on terms
"that are just." If the Court reverses the denial of rule 60(b) relief, it should not return re-open
the post-conviction case at its ten-year-old starting point. After the criminal proceedings
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conclude, society has a strong interest in finality. In addition, Ms. Hunsaker's surviving family
members have a right to the speedy resolution of the post-conviction proceedings. The
undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Menzies was abusing the discovery process
personally. It would not be "just" to restart the post-conviction case.
VII. To facilitate the rule 60(b) evidentiary hearing, the court permitted discovery. In
that discovery, the rule 60(b) court ordered Mr. Menzies to disclose to respondent documents
that Mr. Menzies claimed were privileged. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered
respondent to return the documents and to destroy all working copies that respondent made.
However, the court never expressly ruled that the documents were privileged.
Mr. Menzies states that respondent has not complied with that order. Nothing in the
record supports that accusation. Mr. Menzies also argues that the remedy was insufficient, and
that this Court should order respondent to search its files, identify any copies of the disputed
documents that he received from sources other than Mr. Menzies, and destroy those copies as
well. Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived any challenge to the rule 60(b) court's procedures: the
court followed the procedures Mr. Menzies suggested. In any event, Mr. Menzies cites no
authority for the extraordinary relief he requests that this Court grant.
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E RULE 60(b) COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
MENZIES 5 ACTS BARRED RELIEF

THAT

MR.

Mr. Menzies sought relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)(mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect) and (6)(any other reason justifying relief). In support, he argued that he
should not be held responsible for Mr. Brass's deficient representation. Relying on this Court's
11

decision in TS. v. State, 82 P.3d 1104, 2003 UT 54 (R. 3740-41), the rule 60(b) court agreed.7
However, also relying on T.S., the rule 60(b) court concluded that Mr. Menzies' acts made it
inequitable to grant him relief. The court found that: 1) Mr. Men2ies knew or should have
known that Mr. Brass was providing inadequate representation; 2) Mr. Menzies knew how to
bring this problem to the post-conviction court's attention, but did not; and 3) by failing to bring
the matter to the post-conviction court's attention, Mr. Menzies acquiesced in the case delay and
was not entitled to relief from the post-conviction judgment against him. (R. 3740-51.)
Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously held him
accountable for his acts. He also has not demonstrated that the evidence was plainly insufficient
to support the rule 60(b) court's findings.
A.

Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously concluded that
his own acts barred relief from the post-conviction judgment.
In T.S., this Court held that an indigent party's statutory right to appointed counsel in

parental termination cases implied a right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at %l.
However, the Court also held that "a party!s own negligent or intentional acts might render . .
. relief inequitable, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at *[[13.

7

The rule 60(b) court analyzed this issue under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6) (R.
3740-51, 3756-63). Respondent disagrees that 60(b)(1) applies. That section refers to
excusable conduct. As detailed in the rule 60(b) court's decision and in this brief, this is not
a case of excusable conduct. Moreover, as detailed in point II, Mr. Menzies did not seek
timely relief under rule 60(b)(1).
However, if this Court concludes that Mr. Menzies had a state statutory right to the
effective assistance of appointed counsel, respondent agrees for purposes of this appeal only
that the Court may assess that claim under rule 60(b)(6). Respondent reserves the right in
future actions to argue that a litigant must pursue that claim in a separate post-conviction
petition rather than through rule 60(b) relief.
12

The rule 60(b) court concluded that Mr. Menzies' acts made rule 60(b) relief inequitable.8
The rule 60(b) court had broad discretion to decide whether to set aside the judgment,
and this Court will reverse only if the rule 60(b) court abused it. See, e.g., Lund v. T>rown^ 11 P.3d
277,2000 UT 75 ^[9-10. An abuse occurs, for example, where the court founds its decision on
flawed legal conclusions. Id. at ^|9.
On appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that: 1) the rule 60(b) court improperly held him
accountable for Mr. Brass's deficient representation; 2) the T.S. holding that his own negligent
or intentional acts cannot apply to him because he could waive further post-conviction review
only upon direct court inquiry; 3) the post-conviction court, not he, bore the burden of
monitoring Mr. Brass's performance; and 4) requiring him to contact the post-conviction court
directly about his appointed counsel's deficient performance conflicts with standard and sound
practice. Appellant's Brief at 26-44.
The first argument is frivolous. The rule 60(b) court repeatedly ruled that Mr. Menzies
could not be held accountable for Mr. Brass's actions (R. 3742, 3750, 3766, and 3768). All of
the facts on which the court relied in denying relief focused on why Mr. Menzies should have
taken action and his failure to do so, not on Mr. Brass's failures. (R. 3740-51; point IB below.)
In the second argument, Mr. Menzies reasons that holding him accountable for inaction
equates to an improper presumed waiver of constitutional rights that a criminal defendant can
waive only after a court has determined that he wishes to waive the right, and does so
"'intelligently and understandably.'" Appellant's Brief at 27-28 (citations omitted). In essence,
8

As detailed in point II, T.S. should not apply to establish a right to the effective
assistance of appointed capital post-conviction counsel.
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Mr. Menzies argues that the rule 60(b) court relied on a flawed legal conclusion because the T.S.
holding that his negligent or intentional acts may bar relief cannot apply to him. Instead,
according to Mr. Menzies, the rule 60(b) court could deny relief for Mr. Brass's deficient
performance only if the post-conviction court had brought Mr. Menzies into court sua sponte and
determined that Mr. Menzies affirmatively wished to waive any further post-conviction review.
Mr. Menzies never made this argument to the rule 60(b) court.9 Therefore, the Court
may reverse only if Mr. Menzies establishes that the principle he argues was correct and was so
well established that the rule 60(b) court should have recognized and applied it despite Mr.
Menzies' failure to raise it. See, e.g., State v. Ke/Iy 61 P.3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 1J32 (Utah Supreme
Court will review arguments raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error); State v.
Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 403-405 (Utah 1994) (same), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); State v.
E/dredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) (error not obvious where the appellate decision requiring the
omitted action had not yet been decided), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Mr. Menzies has not
acknowledged this standard or attempted to meet it. By itself, that failure defeats his claim. State
v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 7ffl}46-48(rejecting a constitutional claim first raised on
appeal where Gulbransen did not argue plain error).10

9

On the T.S. negligence element, Mr. Menzies argued only that the record was
undisputed that he had done nothing negligent or intentional that would bar relief (R. 3291).
After taking evidence, the rule 60(b) court disagreed.
10

In a separate point, Mr. Menzies genetically asserts that, if he did not preserve any
claims, the Court should address them under the plain error standard. Appellant's Brief at
49. This blanket assertion without any claim-specific analysis fails to meet Mr. Menzies'
obligation to support his claims with analysis and authority. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a) (9) (requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their arguments
and to include the grounds for reviewing unpreserved issues); State v. Honie, 57 P.3d 977,
14

Mr. Menzies also cites no case that demonstrates obvious error. Mr. Menzies assumes
without citation to any authority and without any analysis that the rule 60(b) court should have
applied a waiver-of-rights analysis. Mr. Menzies confuses a failure to pursue a right with a
"waiver" of that right. See Manning v. State, 89 P.3d 196, 2004 UT App 87 fflf23-28 (rejecting
Manning's argument that she was entided to resentencing to resurrect her appeal unless the
circumstances demonstrated a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right), cert, granted, 98 P.3d
1177 (Utah Aug 11, 2004). Mr. Menzies' reasoning would require all courts, civil and criminal,
trial and appellate, to hold a case open until a party fully litigated all issues or expressly told the
court that he waived his right to proceed. No court could dismiss a case for lack of prosecution,
as this Court did when Mr. Menzies failed to file his post-conviction appellate brief. Mr.
Menzies demonstrates no error, let alone obvious error, for failing to apply the waiver-of-rights

2002 UT 61 ^[61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not
demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the Court should apply cited constitutional
provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863. Mr. Menzies has asked this
Court to craft his argument for him. As it has in the past, the Court should refuse to do so.
Id. (cc[a]s we have repeatedly reminded, this court is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439, 489 (Utah 1988) ("c[t]his Court will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole
cloth on behalf of defendants in capital cases"') (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).
Mr. Menzies also asks the Court to abandon the plain error requirement. Precedent
that Mr. Menzies has not disclosed, including the opinion from his direct appeal, forecloses
this argument. Even on direct, mandatory review in a death case, this Court will reverse on
unpreserved issues only if the capital defendant establishes plain error. See, e.g., State v. Kell
and State v. Menkes cited in the text. Mr. Menzies offers no reasoned basis for applying plain
error in mandatory direct review in a death case, but not in review of the denial of relief from
a judgment denying collateral relief. If Mr. Menzies intends to argue that this Court should
abandon its well-established precedent applying plain error in all death cases, he has a
"substantial burden of persuasion" to justify doing so. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 398. Mr.
Menzies has not acknowledged the precedent, acknowledged the burden he bears to overturn
it, or attempted to meet it.
15

rule to this case.
Mr. Menzies relies solely on cases discussing a criminal defendant's waiver of
constitutional rights. Appellant's Brief at 28 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
(criminal defendant's waiver counsel), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 516 (1972) (criminal
defendant's waiver of speedy trial tight)). Utah post-conviction proceedings are civil. See, e.g.,
Maxwell v. Turner, 435 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1967) (habeas petition challenging a guilty plea is
"civil in nature"); Burleigh v. Turner, 388 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1964) (habeas is a civil remedy). Mr.
Menzies cites no authority for the proposition that the same waiver standards apply in civil
proceedings.11
The sum of Mr. Menzies' argument is his unsupported conclusion that the civil cases on
which the rule 60(b) court relied "do not control in a quasi-criminal capital case such as this."
Appellant's Brief at 29. Mr. Menzies relies only on a "Cf." cite to this Court's opinion in Sims
v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). Id. at n.67.
Sims does not establish that the rule 60(b) court should have rejected the well-established
precedent that Utah post-conviction proceedings are civil, recognized the case as "quasi11

Even in a criminal case, the law does not require an in-court inquiry into every
waiver. For example, a criminal defendant who does not file a timely motion to suppress
evidence will waive his opportunity to vindicate the violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). The trial court does not have to call the defendant into
court and determine that he intentionally did not file the motion. Similarly, a criminal
defendant who does not preserve his constitutional claims in the trial court will have his state
constitutional right to appellate review limited to plain error review, and will lose the right to
appellate review altogether if he fails to argue plain error. State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7
^[46-48. Applying those rules does not require this Court to bring the criminal appellant
into court and engage him in a colloquy to determine that he intentionally or knowingly
failed to preserve the constitutional claim in the trial court, or that he intentionally or
knowingly concluded not to argue plain error on appeal.
16

criminal," and then conclude that the case's new "quasi-criminal" designation precluded applying
the part of T.S. that would hold Mr. Menzies accountable for his acts. Sims was not a postconviction case and certainly did not hold that post-conviction cases are "quasi-criminal."12
Under Sims, an action that the legislature labels "civil" becomes "quasi-criminal," affording to
the defendant the rights that a criminal defendant would enjoy, only 1) when the action seeks
to deter and punish criminal activity; and 2) where the proof is "inextricably connected with
proof of criminal activity." Id. at 13-14.13 Mr. Menzies has not argued that a post-conviction
case, where he proceeds against the State and where the State does not have to prove criminal
activity, so clearly satisfies this criteria that the post-conviction court should have considered his
post-conviction action "quasi-criminal" and refused to apply the T.S. negligence element to
him.14

12

When, over eleven years ago, one former justice of this Court stated that
characterizing post-conviction cases as "civil" was a "fiction," only one other justice joined.
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah) (Zimmerman, CJ., with Durham, J., concurring),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Respondent could find no case that characterized Utah postconviction cases as "criminal" or "quasi-criminal," and Mr. Menzies cites none.
13

In Sims, a state agency commenced a statutory civil action to recover a $400,000 tax
assessment and penalty from Sims because the illegal drugs seized from his car did not bear
the statutorily required tax stamp. Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d at 7.
14

Mr. Menzies also cites a Fourth Circuit case that he states "survey[s] federal
decisions regarding the hybrid nature of habeas cases." Appellant's Brief at 29 n.67 (quoting
O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 504-507 (4th Cir. 2005)). This citation also establishes no
obvious error. First, how a federal intermediate appellate court characterizes federal habeas
actions does not constitute clearly controlling precedent defining Utah post-conviction
actions as "quasi-criminal." See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36 (Utah) (error not obvious
where the appellate decision requiring the omitted action had not yet been decided). Second,
nothing in O'Brien suggests that "hybrid" equates to "quasi-criminal": a term of art in both
Utah and federal jurisprudence applied only to actions that meet certain criteria. One 1958
Plymouth v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 70 (1965) (finding forfeiture proceeding
17

Mr. Menzies next argues that holding him responsible for his own negligence "is flatly
at legal odds with the Utah legislative scheme for indigent capital post-conviction cases, which
puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of the trial court to appoint qualified lawyers and to
remove appointed lawyers who are not functioning as they should?* Appellant's Brief at 30 (emphasis
added). Again, Mr. Menzies did not make this argument below and has not argued plain error
on appeal. Again, Mr. Menzies' authority does not demonstrate obvious error.
Mr. Menzies relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004), Utah R. Crim. P. 8,
and Utah Administrative Code 25-14-6. Section 202 required the post-conviction court to
appoint qualified counsel. Rule 8(e) delineates the necessary qualifications.15 Administrative
Code Section 25-14-6 allows the Division of Finance to recover fees it has paid when a capital
post-conviction attorney is removed due to "misconduct" or a conflict that he should have
disclosed prior to the appointment. None of the above "squarely" or otherwise requires a postconviction court to monitor whether counsel is providing adequate representation and remove
them if they are not.16

initiated by the government against an automobile because it was used to commit a crime was
"quasi-criminal," entitling the owner to the benefit of the suppression rule, because its object
was to punish the owner for the committing a crime); Sims v. State Tax Comm'n^ 814 P.2d at
13-14.
15

As established in point IV, the post-conviction court appointed counsel with rule
8(e) qualifications.
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Mr. Menzies complains that the post-conviction court and respondent "must have
known" that Mr. Brass's representation was substandard. Again, Mr. Menzies never argued
this as a circumstance that foreclosed applying the T.S. lack-of-negligence element to him.
Moreover, the post-conviction court and respondent knew only that Mr. Brass did not
complete discovery and filed no opposition to respondent's sanctions and summary
judgment motions. It was not until the rule 60(b) proceedings that Mr. Brass made clear that
18

Finally, Mr. Menzies contends that the rule 60(b) court erroneously found him liable for
his failure to contact the post-conviction court about his case's obvious failure to progress. He
asserts that the ruling "conflicts with sound and standard practice, wherein trial courts routinely
forbid represented people to communicate directly with the courts." Appellant's Brief at 31.
The argument misstates Utah law. Utah law not only permits indigent represented
persons to complain directly to the court about appointed counsel's performance, it mandates
that the court address the concerns. See State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382, 1999 UT 40 ^|27 (when a
defendant '"expresses dissatisfaction with counsel,'" "the trial courts in all cases should conduct
specific inquiry") (citing State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987)), cert, denied, 528
U.S. 1083.
B.

Mr. Menzies has not argued or demonstrated that the evidence was plainly insufficient
to hold him accountable for his negligent and intentional acts.
Mr. Menzies asserts that the rule 60(b) court's denial of relief "hinges" on inadequate and

clearly erroneous factual findings. Appellant's Brief at 32-44. Mr. Menzies did not make this
argument to the rule 60(b) court. Consequently, he may succeed only if he demonstrates plain
error. See State v. Ho/gate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74 ffi[ll-19 (Court will review unpreserved
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error only). He has not acknowledged this

he had no legitimate basis for his failures. At the time they occurred, an equally supportable
inference was that Mr. Brass had reviewed the remaining claims, consulted with Mr. Menzies,
concluded that the remaining claims had no legal or factual support, and concluded that he
could buy Mr. Menzies some more time by requiring respondent to proceed through the
necessary steps to bring the post-conviction case to a close.
Although Mr. Menzies faults everyone else for failing to monitor his case and take
action on his behalf, he has drawn the line at faulting this Court for failing to remove Mr.
Brass even though Mr. Brass never filed a post-conviction appellate brief.
19

standard, let alone attempted to meet it. The claim fails for that reason alone. State v. Gulbransen,
2005 UT 7 ffi[46-48.
Alternatively, Mr. Men2ies has not demonstrated plain error. To succeed on a sufficiency
challenge, Mr. Menzies must "combQ the record for and compil[e] all die evidence" that
supports the rule 60(b) court's finding that Mr. Menzies' negligent and intentional acts precluded
60(b) relief. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. FradanManufacturing Corp., 54 P.3d 1177,2002 UT 94^21; Cfe/z
v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 2004 UT 82 ^[20 (appellant must marshal the evidence "if a
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely factsensitive"). He "'must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82 \J7 (citation omitted). He must '"temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully
embrace [respondent's] position'; he .. . must play the "devil's advocate.'"" Id. at ^{78 (citation
omitted). Then, he must demonstrate that the marshaled evidence was legally insufficient to
support the challenged finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 *[[21.
Mr. Menzies has not fulfilled this obligation. First, he has not presented the "precisely
focused," devil's advocate summary that the law requires. Instead, he co-mingles favorable and
unfavorable evidence to argue that the rule 60(b) court's findings were unsupported. Appellant's
Brief at 32-44.17
17

Mr. Menzies also has not gathered "every scrap" of evidence supporting the rule
60(b) court's findings. The court found that Mr. Menzies had no equitable claim to relief;
other evidence supported that conclusion. For example, despite Mr. Brass's advice that Mr.
Menzies should proceed with his deposition, he twice refused to do so (R. 1971-72; 4125 at
77-78). Mr. Menzies asserted that his reasons changed over time; however, he conceded,
"But at times, to be perfectly honest with you, I didn't want to give — talk to you bastards
20

Mr. Menzies also has not demonstrated that the evidence was obviously legally
insufficient to support the rule 60(b) court's ruling that his acts barred relief. Wilson Supply, Inc.
v, Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^21. In denying relief, the rule 60(b) court relied, in
part, on the following: 1) Mr. Menzies told Mr. Brass that he was innocent, and Mr. Menzies was
personally aware that delay could have severe consequences to the post-conviction outcome; 2)
after Mr. Brass's appointment, Mr. Menzies stopped receiving copies of documents; 3)
throughout Mr. Brass's representation, Mr. Menzies made "literally" hundreds of calls to Mr.
Brass, but spoke to Mr. Brass or a staff member on only a handful of occasions; 4) Mr. Menzies'
letters and journal entries express frustration about Mr. Brass not hiring an investigator or
experts; 5) the letters and journal entries express frustration with his inability to contact Mr.
Brass; 6) when Mr. Lynn Donaldson substituted for Mr. Brass at a court hearing, Mr. Menzies
complained to Mr. Donaldson about the substitution; 7) Mr. Menzies first learned of the
November 5,1999, deposition on that day; 8) Mr. Brass sent a substitute attorney to cover the

that's trying to kill me" (R. 4126 at 190). His refusals necessitated two motions to compel
the deposition and contributed to approximately one year of delay (R. 2093-99). The
undisputed evidence also demonstrates that Mr. Menzies withheld discoverable information,
both during his deposition and in his written discovery responses (R. 4126 at 180-90
(addendum F)). He asserted no privilege that would have alerted respondent that he was
withholding the information.
Mr. Menzies also distorts some of the evidence. For example, he suggests that he
kept Mr. Brass because no one else was available to represent him. Appellant's Brief at 43.
For sole support that no one else was available, he relies on evidence that he never presented
to the rule 60(b) court Appellant's Brief at 4, citing R. 4135. Respondent has moved to
strike that transcript More importantly, he ignores his own testimony that he knew that
there were other qualified lawyers, but he did not think that "the ones that would do it [were]
very swift" (R. 4126 at 168). Far from the portrait Mr. Menzies paints of a helpless inmate at
his attorney's mercy, Mr. Menzies knew he had options and took a calculated risk to stay with
the attorney whom he knew was not pushing his case forward because he preferred that
attorney to the alternatives.
21

deposition; 9) there were no court hearings from the beginning of 1999 through 2002;1910) Mr.
Menzies complained to Mr. Lynn Donaldson, Mr. Richard Uday, and Ms. Amy Donaldson
about Mr. Brass's lack of communication, his "ineffective" representation, and the lack of case
progress;20 11) Mr. Menzies has a certificate of completion in basic paralegal skills; 12) Mr.
Menzies knew that he could contact the court and had done so in the past; 13) during the four
years that Mr. Brass represented Mr. Menzies prior to the summary judgment, Mr. Menzies did
not notify the post-conviction court about the delay in his case; 14) Mr. Menzies had obtained
court dockets from other attorneys in the past; and 15) despite his concerns, Mr. Menzies kept
Mr. Brass as his attorney, which the rule 60(b) court concluded amounted to an intentional
acquiescence in the delay. (R. 3744-50.)21

18

Mr. Menzies states that the rule 60(b) court "noted . . . that Menzies knew that Brass
did not. . . give him notice of the first deposition attended by the unqualified substitute
lawyer." Appellant's Brief at 42. The rule 60(b) court "noted" nothing about the substitute
attorney's qualifications.
19

Mr. Menzies faults the accuracy of this finding only because the period actually
spanned from December 1998 to August 2003.
20

Mr. Menzies faults the finding's accuracy only for referring to Ms. Donaldson as an
attorney; she is not. Appellant's Brief at 38.
21

Mr. Menzies challenges the rule 60(b) court's characterization that he intentionally
acquiesced in the delay. He contends that it is clearly erroneous because Mr. Brass was
misleading him about the case status. Appellant's Brief at 33-35. Mr. Menzies misstates the
rule 60(b) court's reasoning. Mr. Brass did not begin misleading Mr. Menzies about the case
status until after the judgment had been entered (R. 4125 at 92-93). The court relied on Mr.
Menzies' pre-judgment failures to act despite his awareness of Mr. Brass's deficient
representation to find that Mr. Menzies intentionally acquiesced in the delay. Moreover, as
demonstrated in footnote 16, Mr. Menzies' testimony demonstrates that he chose to keep
Mr. Brass despite the delays because he preferred Mr. Brass to the alternative counsel
available; that choice was an intentional acquiescence in the delay.
22

Mr. Menzies has not challenged the accuracy of these facts in any material way. He also
has not argued how they fail as a matter of law to support the court's conclusion that, under
T.S., Mr. Menzies5 acts and omissions precluded relief because he knew the importance of
proceeding expeditiously, knew that Mr. Brass was not proceeding expeditiously, and knew how
to contact the post-conviction court about the problem, but did not. Instead, he contends that
they fail to support finding that he intentionally and knowingly waived his rights, and that they
do not support holding him accountable for Mr. Brass's negligence. Appellant's Brief at 42-43.
As established in point IA, Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court should
have applied a waiver-of-rights analysis, and the rule 60(b) court did not hold him accountable
for Mr. Brass's negligence.
Mr. Menzies also complains that many of the findings are incomplete because they
allegedly fail to take into account other evidence and argues that some are clearly erroneous.
The Court need not resolve whether Mr. Menzies has met his burden to challenge those
findings. Mr. Menzies has not argued that the allegedly erroneous findings render the rule 60(b)
court's conclusion legally insupportable in light of the facts that he has not challenged or in light
of the facts that he has not marshaled. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^[21,22
22

Mr. Menzies' argument that some findings are "incomplete" assumes that the rule
60(b) court failed to take into account any evidence that it did not specifically address. He
cites no support for that assumption. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, the Court
must assume that the rule 60(b) court took the evidence into account, but found it
unpersuasive. See State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah
1997) (the Court must resolve all disputes in the light most favorable to the lower court's
determination), cert, denied, Utah v. Cannon, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000).
Moreover, Mr. Menzies merely argues that the rule 60(b) court should have drawn the
inferences from the evidence in his favor. For example, Mr. Menzies argues that the court
did not take into account 1) Mr. Brass's testimony that Mr. Menzies complained about
23

In sum, Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously held him
accountable for his negligent and intentional acts.
II.

THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM O N T H E ALTERNATIVE BASES THAT T H E
RULE 60(B) COURT SHOULD N O T HAVE APPLIED T.S. TO THIS CASE,
A N D , EVEN IF T.S. SHOULD APPLY, MR. MENZIES NEVER PROVED
THAT HIS POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
The Court may affirm the denial of relief on any legitimate ground, including any ground

that the lower court considered but rejected. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 2002 UT 58
TJ10 (the Court may affirm the outcome on any "legal ground or theory apparent on the
record'") (citation omitted), State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (the Court may affirm the
outcome on a theory that the lower court considered and rejected).
A.

The Court should not create a statutory right to the effective assistance of capital postconviction counsel.
As stated above, T.S. recognized a statutory right to the effective assistance of appointed

counsel in parental termination cases. That holding makes a poor fit in post-conviction cases.
First, the statute providing for appointed counsel in parental termination cases included no

memory problems and reported taking medication to treat depression, 2) Mr. Menzies was
influenced to keep Mr. Brass due to the lack of a viable alternative and 3) testimony that
three criminal defense attorneys told Mr. Menzies to keep Mr. Brass, who ultimately would
provide excellent representation. Appellant's Brief at 39 and 43. The Court may not reverse
on Mr. Menzies5 invitation to draw the inferences in his favor. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82
^[78 (an appellant does not meet the marshaling requirement when he "simply restate [s] or
review[s] evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's
finding of fact"). Mr. Menzies cites no authority that, as a matter of law, 1) the rule 60(b)
court had to except as accurate Mr. Brass's hearsay account of Mr. Menzies' report of
memory problems; 2) the court had to accept as accurate Mr. Menzies' testimony that he
kept Brass due to the lack of a "viable" alternative; or 3) the court had to conclude that it was
reasonable for Mr. Menzies to rely on conversations with persons not his attorneys advising
him to keep Mr. Brass rather than bring his concerns to the post-conviction court's attention.
24

language defining the expectations for counsel's representation. Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-319
(2002). This left a blank slate on which to write an "effective assistance" requirement. By
contrast, section 78-35a-202 requires courts to appoint counsel who "is qualified to represent
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure." Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-202(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). This language expresses anintent
to minimize the risk of deficient representation by providing qualified and compensated counsel;
not an intent to insure against that risk by creating a right to effective representation.
Second, T.S. created the right to effective representation at a stage where the State was
proceeding against a party to terminate the relationship between a parent and child. The Sixth
Amendment guaranteed to Mr. Menzies the same right in the criminal proceedings when the
State proceeded against him to take away his life. However, at this stage, Mr. Menzies is
proceeding against the State to challenge his presumptively valid conviction and sentence. The
legislature properly limited the provision of counsel to compensation and minimum
qualifications without guaranteeing counsel whose representation in the civil action against the
State again satisfied Sixth Amendment standards.
Finally, writing an effective assistance requirement into section 202 would make capital
post-conviction litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences. A capital postconviction petitioner who failed to obtain relief on his first state petition could file a second
petition challenging his prior post-conviction counsel's effectiveness. If he failed, he could file
another petition challenging post-post-conviction counsel's effectiveness, and so on.23 The
lz

Cf.} e.g., Bonin v. Vasque^ 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Or. 1993) (refusing to recognize a
federal constitutional right to state post-conviction counsel, even when state post-conviction
25

legislature did not intend to create unending state post-conviction review and render death
sentences incapable of execution.
B.

Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived any claim that he has a constitutional right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel; alternatively, he has not established that
any such right obviously existed.
Mr. Menzies also argues that he has a state and federal constitutional right to the effective

assistance of state post-conviction counsel. Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived this argument.
Mr. Menzies raised part of the argument in a memorandum that the rule 60(b) court struck as
untimely (R. 3694-96). Mr. Menzies attempted to raise that part again and raised the rest of the
argument in point IV of his T.S. memorandum (R. 3296-99). Later, Mr. Menzies agreed that the
rule 60(b) court would not have to resolve respondent's motion to strike point IV as untimely
because the rule 60(b) court said that it would not rely on the constitutional argument (R. 369496). Thus, Mr. Menzies induced the lower court not to resolve the argument he presses on
appeal. Mr. Menzies' waiver bars review even under a plain error standard. See, e.g, State v.
bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
At most, the Court could review the argument for plain error: Mr. Menzies never made
the arguments timely. The argument still fails because Mr. Menzies has not argued plain error.
State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^[46-48. His authority does not satisfy that burden. Mr. Menzies
argues that Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), recognized a possible federal constitutional

provides the first opportunity to litigate trial counsel's effectiveness, because the right likely
would result in "an infinite continuum of litigation"); Breard v. Netherlands 949 F. Supp. 1255,
1266 (E.D. Va) (recognizing a federally protected right to state post-conviction counsel
would create a similar right at every stage because each new pleading presents the first
opportunity to challenge prior counsel's effectiveness), affirmed, Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615
(4th Cir.), cert, denied, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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right to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel when state post-conviction
provides the first opportunity to challenge trial and appellate counsel's effectiveness. Appellant's
Brief at 17-18. Mr. Menzies distorts Coleman. The Supreme Court applied its well-established
precedent rejecting the right Mr. Menzies claims and refused to recognize the exception he
argues. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 755-57. Several courts have since followed suit.24 What
the controlling precedent makes obvious is that there exists no federal constitutional right to the
effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel.25
Mr. Menzies also argues that "many provisions" of Utah's constitution "broadly
supportQ" a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Appellant's Brief at 1617. Again, he cites no clearly controlling authority that such a right exists; his laundry list of
constitutional provisions that he claims would support recognizing that right demonstrate no
plain error. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 36 (Utah) (no plain error where legal precedent was

2A

Martine% p. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Or. 2001) (precedent precludes
considering whether an exception exists "under the Coleman rule"), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1163
(2002); Mackallv. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Or. 1997) (rejecting argument that Coleman
recognizes a loophole because Coleman did not adopt the exception to the prior precedent),
cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1100 (1998); Rill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015,1025-26 (11th Or. 1996) (no right
to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel even when post-conviction
presents the first opportunity to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness), cert, denied, 519 U.S.
1119 (1997); Bonin v. Vasque^ 999 F.2d at 429-30 (refusing to recognize an exception, in part
because doing so likely would cause an "infinite continuum" of litigation); Breard v.
Netherland, 949 F. Supp. at 1265-66 (same).
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Mr. Menzies also suggests that his federal right to court access and equal protection
require recognizing a federally protected right to the effective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Appellant's Brief at 18-19. As demonstrated in the text, the controlling
federal precedent holds that no such right exists. Mr. Menzies also fails to disclose that this
Court has rejected his court-access argument, let alone offering any reason to overturn that
precedent. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 530.
27

not decided at the time of the district court decision).26
C.

The Court may also affirm on the alternative ground that Mr. Menzies never established
that Mr. Brass was ineffective.
In T.S., this Court relied on State ex relE.H. v. AM., 880 P.2d 11 (Utah App.), cert denied,

890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). T.S v. State, 2003 UT 54 f!- Under EM., Mr. Menzies must prove
both deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced his case. State ex rel
EM

v. AM,

880 P.2d at 13 (adopting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as the

standard for proving the denial of a state statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel).
Respondent concedes that, as to the seven ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr.
Brass performed deficiently. However, Mr. Menzies failed to prove prejudice as to any of his
post-conviction claims. Instead, he asks the Court to presume prejudice. Appellant's Brief at
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Mr. Menzies relies on Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). Harris says
nothing about providing counsel who meet Sixth Amendment standards. Moreover, as
detailed on point IV, Harris describes what due process guarantees when the State proceeds
against a criminal defendant to take away his liberty. That proceeding ended for Mr. Menzies
nearly seventeen years ago.
Mr. Menzies arguments amount to nothing more than an assertion that it would be a
good idea to recognize the right and providing a list of state constitutional provisions that
Mr. Menzies claims would support it. The Court has already rejected similar arguments as
inadequately briefed. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 61 ^[61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state
constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the
Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create the proposed rule). For the
reasons argued in the text, recognizing a right to the effective assistance of counsel would not
be good policy; it would create unending capital state post-conviction litigation. Mr.
Menzies' arguments also rely on flawed assumptions. For example, he asserts that the open
courts provision necessitates providing effective representation due the "complicated
procedural and substantive lawyering that is required in capital post-conviction cases."
Appellant's Brief at 17. Similarly, he asserts that providing counsel will "insure the enduring
effectiveness" of post-conviction review in capital cases. Id. at 16. However, the same
procedural and substantive law applies in all collateral challenges to criminal convictions; not
just capital cases.
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20. For support, he relies on three federal cases. Appellant's Brief at 20 and n.42. All three
dealt with the federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during criminal
proceedings. The federal courts have refused to recognize a similar right in state post-conviction
proceedings. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 755 (1991) (Coleman had no Sixth
Amendment right to post conviction counsel). If Mr. Menzies has a state statutory right to the
effective assistance of counsel, E.H. requires him to prove prejudice; it says nothing about
presuming prejudice. Mr. Menzies provides no analysis or authority for incorporating the
presumed-prejudice components of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence into a state statutory
"effective assistance" right.27
Mr. Menzies also misstates the prejudice standard that he would have to satisfy. He
suggests that he can prove prejudice merely by showing that, if Mr. Brass had opposed the
motions at issue, the post-conviction court would not have granted them. Appellant's Brief at
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Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that this case parallels the situations where the
federal courts presume prejudice. Two of the cases presume prejudice when counsel fails to
file an appeal notice because the failure forfeits the entire appellate proceeding. Appellant's
Brief at 20 n.42. Mr. Brass did not forfeit the entire post-conviction proceeding by failing to
file a petition in the first place. The third case presumes prejudice when counsel entirely fails
to subject the State's case to any meaningful adversarial testing. Here, the State had no case
to subject to adversarial testing; Mr. Menzies, not the State, was the plaintiff. In any event,
that exception applies only when the failure is "entire]]"; the exception will not apply for
failing to oppose the state at specific points in the proceedings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,
696-97 (2002). The extensive litigation that preceded Mr. Brass's appointment by itself
precludes finding an entire failure to prosecute this case. Moreover, Mr. Brass's performance
was not a "complete failure" to act. Mr. Brass obtained the file, reviewed it, filed a second
amended petition adding claims, and concluded that Mr. Menzies would be better off in
federal court. He misunderstood that failing to litigate the ineffective assistance claims in
state court would forfeit federal review of those claims. (R. 1231, 4126 at 138-39.) That
error, although deficient, cannot be characterized as a "complete failure" to act on Mr.
Menzies' behalf.
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19-20.28 However, Mr. Menzies must prove that, absent Mr. Brass's deficient performance, there
is a reasonable probability that the post-conviction court would have granted post-conviction
relief, not merely that he could have won on discrete pre-judgment motions. State ex relE.H.
v. A.H., 880 P.2d at 13-14.29 Mr. Menzies has never attempted to establish prejudice. That
failure alone precludes granting relief.
Moreover, this case illustrates why Mr. Menzies must prove prejudice. Mr. Menzies
clearly could not have avoided dismissal or summary judgment on his first seventy-one claims.
The post-conviction court dismissed those claims because Mr. Menzies raised and lost them on
direct appeal. That procedural bar is absolute. Carter v. Galetka, AA P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 Tf6.
As to theineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel-claims, this Court has already recognized
that Mr. Menzies' trial counsel's effectiveness "is in significant part a question of behavior
observable from the record

" Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Uno, 932 P 2d 589, 592 (Utah

1997). Mr. Menzies had access to that record; under this Court's reasoning, he had access to the
major tool to demonstrate that his ineffective assistance claims were reasonably likely to succeed.
He did not do so.
Moreover, the post-conviction court's summary judgment analysis demonstrates that,
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Mr. Menzies has not proven prejudice even under his standard. He asserts that he
met that standard because he asked his counsel to investigate his case. Appellant's Brief at
20. Even the most complete investigation may not have produced sufficient evidence to
withstand summary judgment.
29

Cf also Ysmmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986). Morrison claimed that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and timely move to suppress seized evidence.
The Supreme Court held that the prejudice inquiry was "whether a reasonable probability
exists that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt concerning respondent's guiltif the
[seized evidence] and related testimony had been excluded." Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
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even if Mr. Menzies could have provided additional evidence to support his ineffectiveassistance claims if Mr. Brass had investigated them beyond the record, they still would have
failed as a matter of law (R. 2240-52, 2258).30 Mr. Menzies has never attempted to demonstrate
the contrary.
Finally, some of the claims are frivolous. For example, Mr. Menzies claimed that his trial
counsel insufficiently investigated evidence that would establish that someone else murdered Ms.
Hunsaker (R. 2254). However, Mr. Menzies conceded that he had no specific information that
would identify someone else as the killer; he relied only on a bare assertion that "if [trial counsel]
had done a reasonable investigation I'm sure they would have found out who it was" (R. 2789).31
Presuming prejudice to set aside a judgment and allow further litigation on claims that have no
reasonable probability of succeeding will serve no purpose other than unjustified delay.32

30

For example, Mr. Menzies claimed that his counsel failed to develop impeachment
evidence that Walter Britton's testimony that Mr. Menzies confessed to him tracked
information available in the general media. The post-conviction court concluded that, even
if trial counsel could have proven that Mr. Britton's testimony actually tracked media
accounts, he could not prove that it would have affected the outcome. The post-conviction
court reasoned that trial counsel argued without contradiction that Mr. Britton's testimony
tracked media accounts, yet the jury convicted Mr. Menzies anyway. The post-conviction
court further reasoned that, even if Mr. Britton had not testified at all, there would be no
reasonable likelihood of an acquittal because the state produced overwhelming independent
evidence of Mr. Menzies' guilt. (R. 2249-51.)
31

Respondent recognizes that Mr. Menzies gave a more detailed version of this claim
to his prior investigator (R. 184). However, he has succeeded in excluding that information
from this record (R. 3899). The only record evidence concerning this claims demonstrates
that it is frivolous.
32

Mr. Menzies also appears to argue that this Court has boundless authority to reverse
the denial of rule 60(b) relief. He relies on "flexibility" in "capital habeas case[s]," the court's
"supervisory powers," and the "standard practice of granting relief from default judgments."
Appellant's Brief at 49-50. This appeal is not a habeas appeal; it is an appeal denying relief
31

III.

MR. BRASS'S DEFICIENT REPRESENTATION DOES NOT JUSTIFY
RULE 60(b)(1) RELIEF

A.

Rule 60(b)(1) does not hold a client harmless for his attorney's negligence.
Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment if a party proves "mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect." Mr. Menzies argues that, independent of any statutory right to
the effective assistance of counsel, Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) permits relief when a party relies on
his attorney and his attorney was inexcusably negligent. In essence, he argues that rule 60(b)(1)
holds the parties harmless for their attorney's errors. This Court has already rejected that
argument: "any neglect by [defendant's] attorney is attributable to [defendant] through principles
of agency." See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). See also Federal Fin. Co. v.
Ranchita, 2000 UT App 56, 2000 WL 33249387 (addendum G).
Mr. Menzies' authority does not establish the contrary. Mr. Menzies asserts that, in

from judgment. Moreover, Mr. Menzies' mischaracterizes the scope of habeas relief. He
cites solely to federal authority, but ignores that federal habeas relief is subject to strict
procedural limitations. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that
Coleman was barred from federal habeas review of claims first raised in state post-conviction
because he defaulted the state appeal by filing an appeal notice one day late). Mr. Menzies
cites no authority for this Court using its supervisory authority to ignore the usual limitations
on rule 60(b) relief. See State v. Home, 2002 UT 61 ^[61 n.7 (declining Honie's invitation to
adopt a state constitutional rule where Horde provided no meaningful analysis for doing so).
Finally, the "standard practice" of setting aside default judgments does not apply. As
explained in footnote 5, this is not a default judgment Moreover, the "standard practice"
applies only if Mr. Menzies demonstrates his entitlement to rule 60(b) relief. For the reasons
argued, he has not.
Mr. Menzies also argues that the unopposed summary judgment and sanctions orders
"effectively circumvented" his right to habeas corpus and violated his rights to equal
protection because he is "receiving a radically different application of the laws than all other
indigent capital defendants." Appellant's Brief at 21-23. In essence, he argues that a postconviction court can never grant relief on an unopposed motion. He cites ao authority to
support that proposition.
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Interstate Excavating Inc, v, Agla Development Cop,, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), this Court held that
the "trial court should have granted relief under 60(b)(1) after learning that default entered
because defendant's lawyer did not give him notice of trial date and withdrew, and upon learning
this, defendant immediately sought relief."

Appellant's Brief at 24 n.53.

Mr. Menzies

mischaracterizes Interstate, In that case, the defendant's lawyer certified that he mailed to
defendant notice of the trial date and notice that he had withdrawn. Defendant asserted that he
received neither notice. However, defendant did not assert that his former attorney never sent
it; he alleged only that it may have been lost in other papers that the attorney sent. Id, at 370.
This Court did not find that defendant's counsel in fact failed to send the trial date notice or
inform the defendant that he had withdrawn, let alone rely on the unfound failure as a reason
to set aside the judgment.33
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Mr. Menzies also relies on Uncoln Benefit Life Ins, Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838
P.2d 672, 675 (Utah App. 1992) and Yapp v. Excel Corp,, 186 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999).
First, neither the court of appeals nor the Tenth Circuit trumps this Court's precedent in
Martel. Second, neither case supports concluding that the rule 60(b) court should have
granted Mr. Menzies relief. Lincoln held only that, when a litigant relies on counsel's
negligence as a basis for relief, the court must assess the claim under rule 60(b)(1). Because
the litigant did not file the rule 60(b)(1) motion in time, the court of appeals did not resolve
the claim's merits. In Yapp, the Tenth Circuit stated in dicta that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)
permits relief for counsel's mistakes against which the client could not protect. The rule
60(b) court correctly concluded that Mr. Menzies exercised insufficient diligence in
protecting himself. Similarly, to the extent that Mr. Menzies contends that he was excusably
negligent in relying on Mr. Brass, the rule 60(b) court rejected that argument, and, for the
reasons argued in point I, Mr. Menzies has proven no error in that conclusion.
In support of his argument that his reliance on Mr. Brass to litigate his case justifies
rule 60(b)(1) relief, Mr. Menzies asserts that he "has limited access to telephones, and has no
law library, clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or prison contract lawyer for his post-conviction
case .. .." Mr. Menzies' cites no record support for the proposition that he would have had
no access to the prison contract attorneys had he requested it. Mr. Menzies distorts the
record about his telephone access. His own journals and other evidence that he presented to
the rule 60(b) court demonstrate that he bombarded his attorneys with telephone calls and
33

B.

Mr. Menzies did not seek rule 60(b)(1) relief timely.
This Court may affirm the denial of rule 60(b)(1) relief on the alternative basis that Mr.

Menzies did not seek it timely. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (the Court may affirm
the outcome on a theory that the lower court considered and rejected). In order to obtain rule
60(b)(1) relief, Mr. Menzies had to file his motion "not more than 3 months after the judgment
. . . was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relying on the April 11,2002, two-sentence pleading,
Mr. Menzies asserted that he timely moved for rule 60(b)(1) relief.34
Mr. Menzies filed no "motion" as the rules define "motion" until nineteen months after
the post-conviction court entered judgment against him. A motion must "state with particularity
the grounds" for relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Mr. Menzies5 April 11, 2002, pleading stated no
grounds for 60(b) relief. It even failed to cite any particular subsection on which Mr. Menzies

contacted other attorneys by telephone to question Mr. Brass's representation and request
court dockets (R. 3746; 4125 at 19-20, 39-40, 44-45, 60).
Mr. Menzies also argues that agency principles cannot apply to hold him accountable
for Mr. Brass's negligence because he did not hire Mr. Brass and could not fire him.
Appellant's Brief at 26-27. Mr. Brass may have been appointed, but, as the rule 60(b) court
concluded and as Mr. Menzies' testimony establishes, Mr. Menzies decided to keep him as
his attorney despite his deficient performance. He has not argued that agency principles
should not apply under those circumstances. Moreover, Mr. Menzies cites no authority to
support his argument. He relies on a single state case, but only for the proposition that
indigent clients cannot hire and fire their attorneys at will. Appellant's Brief at 27 n.62. He
cites nothing for the proposition that appointed counsel do not act as their client's agent.
Mr. Menzies also cites to a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that a malpractice action
ameliorates public concern about holding a client responsible for his attorney's negligence.
Id. at 27 n.63. He fails to disclose that the United States Supreme Court held a capital state
post-conviction petitioner liable for his appointed state post-conviction counsel's negligence
under agency principles. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) and 1990 Westlaw
10022981 (demonstrating that Coleman's counsel was pro bono, not retained).
34

The rule 60(b) court accepted this argument.
34

relied for relief. Indeed, Mr. Men2ies expressly deferred stating any ground until he filed a
"subsequent memorandum." See Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895,2002 UT 38 ^[59
(Holmes' single sentence request for leave to amend his complaint that failed to articulate "a
single reason" why the court should grant leave to amend and was accompanied by no
memorandum '"did not rise to the level of a motion'") (citing Calderon v. Kansas Dept ofSocial and
Rehabilitative Services, 181 F.3d 1180,1187 (10th Cir. 1999)). He argued no ground for rule 60(b)
relief until August 12, 2003. At best, the April 11, 2002, pleading amounts to notice that
petitioner would move for rule 60(b) relief at some time in the future. That time was sixteen
months too late.
C.

Mr. Menzies has not proven that he had a meritorious post-conviction claim.
The rule 60(b) court could not relieve Mr. Menzies from the judgment unless he

demonstrated that he had a "meritorious" post-conviction claim. See, e.g., Utah State Dept. of Social
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). The Court may also affirm on the
independent alternative basis that Mr. Menzies identified no meritorious claim. Mr. Menzies
should have demonstrated that he had supportable claims that probably would have resulted in
post-conviction relief, but for the unopposed judgment against him. He did not. To the
contrary, he identified no claims beyond those asserted in the three post-conviction petitions.
He ignored the unassailable basis for dismissing the first seventy-one claims (that he litigated and
lost them on direct appeal). He ignored the detailed merits analysis in the summary judgment
order, including the multiple claims that the post-conviction court concluded would fail as a
matter even if Mr. Brass had presented additional evidence during the post-conviction
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proceeding (R. 2230-60). As explained in point II, the Court should not set aside a judgment
to litigate claims that Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated have a reasonable likelihood of resulting
in post-conviction relief.
Respondent recognizes that this Court's precedent has not imposed such a high
"meritorious" showing. Previously, the Court has required a litigant to demonstrate only that
he has a legal claim that, if factually proven, would entitle him to relief; however, he does not
have to prove his case. See, e.g., Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 2000 UT 75 ffl|28-29. However, the
Court adopted that rule in the context of defaults entered at the beginning of the litigation and
relied on that procedural context to support that rule. A majority of the Court has explained
that a higher meritoriousness showing "at the very outset of a case, and prior to any discovery, places an
unduly onerous burden on a defendant otherwise eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)

" Utah

State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1059 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., dissenting,
with two justices concurring) (emphasis added).
The reasons for a lower meritorious showing do not apply here. The notice-pleading rule
that applied in Lund and Musselman did not apply; Mr. Menzies was required to plead all of the
facts on the basis of which he sought post conviction relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3)(c). He
should have had the supporting facts available when he included his claims, and should have
presented them when he moved to set aside the post-conviction judgment. Moreover, the postconviction court entered the unopposed summary judgment in this case not at the outset, but
at the case's end and only after years available for discovery and investigation. Similarly, Mr.
Menzies' post-conviction case was not an entirely new proceeding that required discovery and
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investigation. It was an action collateral to a criminal case with a fully developed record that
provided Mr. Menzies with the principle tool for raising his ineffective-assistance claims. Cf. Salt
Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Unoy 932 P.2d 589, 592 (Utah 1997) (counsel's effectiveness "is in
significant part a question of behavior observable from the record . . ."). 35
Mr. Menzies never attempted to use the tools available to him to prove anything beyond
the facial sufficiency of his claims. He has never acknowledged that the summary judgment
analyzed and denied post-conviction relief on the merits, not on the basis of Mr. Brass's failure
to oppose it. The Court should not set aside the judgment in order to litigate claims on which
Mr. Menzies can never succeed, and certainly not on claims that would fail irrespective of any
incomplete post-conviction investigation.
IV.

T H E RULE 60(b) COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT T H E
JUDGMENT WAS N O T VOID
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits relief from a void judgment. The post-conviction

judgment against Mr. Menzies would be "void" within the meaning of subsection (4) only if the
post-conviction court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process. 'Richins v. Delbert Chipman <& Sons, Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah
App. 1991).

The rule 60(b) court reasoned that subsection (4) focuses on court action, and

that, because most of Mr. Menzies5 arguments relied on Mr. Brass's deficient performance, he
had not demonstrated that the post-conviction judgment was "void." The court also reasoned
35

Mr. Menzies seventy-one procedurally-barred claims also illustrate why the
Musselman/ Lund mtiitoiiousntss standard should not apply. All seventy-one claims meet
that standard: on their face, they state claims that, if proven, would entitle him to relief.
However, all seventy-one have actually failed to provide him relief: he raised and lost them
on direct appeal
37

that subsection (4) would apply only if the post-conviction court's conduct rendered it powerless
to enter judgment; it concluded that the court-action on which Mr. Menzies relied did not meet
that standard. (EL 3751-55.)
Mr. Menzies demonstrates no error in this ruling. Mr. Menzies first contends that "many
cases grant relief under 60(b)(4) as a result of due process denials stemming from inadequate
performance by lawyers." Appellant's Brief at 9. He relies solely on Workman v. Nagk
Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr. Menzies misrepresents Workman. Workman stands for the very proposition on which
the rule 60(b) court relied: rule 60(b)(4) only applies when a due process violation renders the
court powerless to enter the challenged judgment. In Workmen, that occurred because a party
other than the one seeking to set aside the judgment failed to satisfy the conditions precedent
to the court exercising authority over the action before it.36
Mr. Menzies also argues that, even if the post-conviction "court had to be at fault" in
order to justify subsection (4) relief, that occurred because the post-conviction court entered the
summary judgment order without notifying Mr. Menzies or holding a hearing. Appellant's Brief
at 9. Again, the argument establishes no error.
First, in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d), respondent served the judgment on Mr.
3i

"Workman involved a class action commenced by a state agency. However, the
agency never notified the class members of the action or of their right to disassociate
themselves from the class, both of which "are critical requirements for maintenance of a
class action." Id. at 753. The court of appeals held that the agency's failure to notify the
absent class members of the class action voided the judgment in the agency's favor,
permitting rule 60(b) relief to the class members. Contrary to Mr. Menzies' suggestion,
Workman does not stand for the proposition that a party's own attorney's deficient
performance renders a judgment "void."
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Menzies' counsel (R. 2263). Mr. Menzies cites to nothing demonstrating that due process
required the post-conviction court to serve him personally. Second, Mr. Menzies cites to
nothing for the proposition that due process required the post-conviction court to hold a
hearing on the unopposed summary judgment motion, especially when Mr. Menzies never
requested one. Cf. Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-501 (3) (A) (court will decide motion without a
hearing unless a party requests one).
The rule 60(b) court also rejected Mr. Menzies5 argument that the judgment was void
because 1) the post-conviction court allegedly did not assess Mr. Brass's qualifications to
represent Mr. Menzies; and 2) the post-conviction court did not remove Mr. Brass (R. 3754).37
The rule 60(b) court found that neither event left the post-conviction court powerless to rule on
respondent's summary judgment motion.
Mr. Menzies' challenge to this conclusion assumes that every procedural misstep creates
a due process violation that renders a judgment "void" under rule 60(b)(4). The law is
otherwise. See Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., 817 P.2d at 385 (Utah App. 1991) ("'[A]
judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because some irregularity inhered in its
rendition'") (citation omitted).
Mr. Menzies also overstates what due process guaranteed to him during the post-
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Mr. Menzies' first argument distorts the record. Although the post-conviction court
never questioned Mr. Brass about his qualifications, it did require Mr. Menzies' prior postconviction counsel to solicit attorneys who met Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e)'s qualifications (R.
1155). Moreover, Mr. Brass met those qualifications (R. 4126 at 137-38). The second
argument merely restates Mr. Menzies' assumption that the post-conviction court had an
obligation to monitor Mr. Brass's performance. For the reasons argued in point I, Mr.
Menzies fails to establish that the law imposed such an obligation.
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conviction proceedings. He relies on Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945), as the
roadmap for what due process guaranteed him in his state post-conviction case. Appellant's
Brief at 6-12. However, Christiansen only defines the due process rights enjoyed when the State
proceeds against a defendant to take his life or liberty; in that case, through a probation
revocation. Id, See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that, because probation
threatens the loss of conditional liberty, the State may have to provide appointed counsel, but
only under limited circumstances). The State completed that stage of the proceedings seventeen
years ago when it obtained a judgment against Mr. Menzies that forfeits his life. In the postconviction stage, Mr. Menzies was a civil litigant proceeding against the State to challenge his
presumptively lawful conviction and sentence. He offers no analysis or authority for his
assumption that the due process rights he enjoyed when the State proceeded against him apply
when he proceeds against the state. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in [criminal] proceedings does not apply" in non-criminal
proceedings).
Mr. Menzies next argues that he had a constitutionally protected due process right to
counsel who would perform the services described in the administrative rule. For sole support,
he cites to Wolffv. McDonnell fot the proposition that state statutory procedural requirements "are
also elements of due process." Appellant's Brief at 10.
Mr. Menzies falsely suggests that the Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution
protects every right that a state statute creates. Controlling law that Mr. Menzies does not
acknowledge recognizes the contrary. See Kentucky Dept of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
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461 (1989) (listing examples of cases where state statutes created federally protected rights and
those where they did not). A state statute creates a federally protected liberty interest only when
it 1) creates substantive limitations on official discretion, such as imposing substantive predicates
to official decision-making; and 2) mandates the outcome if the relevant criteria have been met.
Id. at 46. Mr. Menzies has not acknowledged this standard, let alone established that the statutes
and rules on which he relies meet it.38
In sum, Mr. Menzies identifies no due process violation let alone one that would have
rendered the post-conviction judgment "void." The rule 60(b) court properly denied rule
60(b)(4) relief.
V.

T H E JUDGMENT DOES N O T APPLY PROSPECTIVELY, NOR HAVE
EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO ITS ENTRY MADE ITS CONTINUED
APPLICATION INEQUITABLE
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) permits relief from a judgment when "it is no longer equitable
38

Mr. Menzies also extrapolates that the ABA Guidelines for representing capital
post-conviction petitioners define the "reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal
services" that the administrative rule required Mr. Brass to provide. For sole support, he
relies on Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Appellant's Brief at 11 and n.18 and 19.
Wiggins referred to the ABA Guidelines for representing capital defendants in criminal
proceedings as one "guide" in determining whether Wiggins' counsel performed objectively
deficiently in his capital murder trial. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 525. Wiggins does not
extend to civil post-conviction cases. Although Mr. Menzies states that the Court "should"
adopt the ABA Guidelines as the standard for counsel in Utah's capital post-conviction
cases, he provides no analysis why the Court "should" do so. See State v. Honie, 57 P.3d 977,
2002 UT 61 TJ61 n.7 (inviting the court to adopt a legal standard without arguing in "any
meaningful way" why it should fails to satisfy the party's obligation to support his appellate
arguments), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863. Indeed, Mr. Menzies fails to disclose that the ABA
Guidelines conflict with controlling Utah law. They require post-conviction counsel to "seek
to litigate all issues, whether or notpreviously presented" ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 10.15.1(C) (emphasis added).
Utah law precludes such litigation as an "abuse of the writ." See, e.g., Carter v. Galetka, 44
P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96ffif6-9.
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that the judgment should have prospective application." To obtain relief under that subsection,
Mr. Menzies had to prove that 1) the judgment has "prospective application;" and 2) subsequent
events have occurred that make it inequitable to enforce the judgment's prospective
components. BJchins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., 817 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah App. 1991).
Mr. Menzies argues that the summary judgment has "prospective application" because
it "bars him from proceeding with his state habeas case, and will likely bar [him] from seeking
relief from the errors alleged in the state post-conviction petition in federal or state courts."
Appellant's Brief at 25.39 He relies solely on Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133
(D.C. Or. 1988).
Twelve John Does defeats rather than supports the "prospective application" argument that
Mr. Menzies advances.

According to the District of Columbia Circuit, a judgment has

"prospective application" within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(5) when it is executory
(requires a party to act or not act in the future) or requires a court to supervise "changing
conduct or conditions." Id. at 1139. The D.C. Circuit held that the judgment at issue
"definitively dismissed" the action against one party; therefore, it did not have "prospective
application" and could not be set aside under subsection (5).
39

Mr. Menzies' argument that it had prospective application because it barred him
from proceeding on his post-conviction petition is frivolous. The post-conviction court did
not enjoin him from proceeding; it entered final judgment ending the post-conviction
litigation.
Mr. Menzies also argues that the discovery orders had prospective application because
they first required Mr. Brass to fulfill his discovery obligation, then forbade Mr. Menzies
from presenting additional evidence. Appellant's Brief at 25. Those orders compelled
discovery and limited evidence in the post-conviction proceeding that the summary judgment
terminated. They had no prospective application when Mr. Menzies sought relief from the
post-conviction judgment.
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Similarly, the summary judgment definitively ended Mr. Menzies5 post-conviction action.
It did not order Mr. Menzies to perform or not perform some future act. There may be
defenses that will bar merits review of some of his claims in other fora, but Mr. Menzies is not
enjoined from seeking such relief. That the judgment has future collateral consequences does
not mean that it has "prospective application" within the meaning of subsection (5). Id. at 1138
(recognizing that all judgments have some "future reverberations," but that a judgment will have
continuing consequences does not mean that it will have "prospective application"). See also Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2003) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) "encompasses the traditional
power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances").40
The rule 60(b) court also concluded that Mr. Menzies identified no events that post-dated
the judgment that made it inequitable to continue its enforcement. (R. 3756.) Mr. Menzies does
not dispute this conclusion. Instead, he argues that some of the events on which he relies for
rule 60(b) relief occurred after the summary judgment. Specifically, he states that he relies on
Mr. Brass's continued failure to notify him about the summary judgment and Mr. Brass's postjudgment misinformation about the case status. Appellant's Brief at 9.
Mr. Menzies did not make this argument below. He has not argued plain error on appeal.
The claim fails for that reason alone. State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 7 ffi[46-48. I n
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Mr. Menzies mistakenly argues that the summary judgment will bar merits review in
federal court. Appellant's Brief at 25. It is the dismissed post-conviction appeal that will bar
merits review in federal court because it will leave the post-conviction claims unexhausted.
He also argues that it will bar federal merits review of claims raised in the post-conviction
petitions. This is true only for claims first raised in those petitions. The aborted postconviction appeal will not bar federal review of claims that Mr. Menzies exhausted by
presenting them to this Court on direct appeal.
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any event, Mr. Menzies has not explained how Mr. Brass's misleading him about the fact that
the judgment had been entered makes the judgment's terms inequitable.
VL

IF T H E COURT REVERSES, IT SHOULD LIMIT ITS REVERSAL TO
SETTING ASIDE T H E SUMMARY JUDGMENT A N D SANCTIONS
ORDERS
A court may grant relief from judgment only "upon such terms as are just." Utah R. Civ.

P. 60(b). Returning this case to its ten-year-old starting point would not be just.
The criminal proceedings, where Mr. Men2ies' interests were paramount, lasted nine years
from Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Mr. Menzies had two years to prepare for trial. The trial took one
month to complete. The appeal, during which the Court allowed Mr. Menzies to present
approximately three hundred pages of briefing (excluding the rehearing petition), lasted seven
years and generated two opinions (R. 1282-1343, 1367-1591).41
At this stage of the proceedings, society has a strong interest in finality.

'"Justice

demands that a convicted defendant have an opportunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once
the appellate process has concluded, society's interest in the effectiveness and integrity of the
criminal justice system requires a finality of judgment that should severely limit repetitive
appeals."' Gerrishv. Karnes, 844P.2d315,320-21 (Utahl992) (quotingBundyp. DeLand,!63V.2d
803, 805 (Utah 1988)).42 The over ten years of post-conviction and rule 60(b) litigation

41

The post-conviction record does not contain copies of the reply briefs, which raise
the total pages to over three hundred.
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In memoranda below, Mr. Menzies has attempted to distinguish Gerrish because Mr.
Gerrish filed numerous petitions and this case involves Mr. Menzies' first post-conviction
petition (R. 2563-64). That technical distinction does not detract from the opinion's policy
statement. Gerrish expressly recognizes that the finality interest attaches after the criminal
proceedings end, not after successive post-conviction petitions. Moreover, Gerrish cited to
44

continues to defeat that interest.
Moreover, Maurine Hunsaker's family have an independent right to speedy resolution
of the post-conviction proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §77-38-7(2) (West 2004). Matt Hunsaker,
as Maurine's representative, has detailed how the violation of that right has affected her
surviving family members (R. 4123 at 14-18). The Court should not sanction further violation
by allowing petitioner to start his ten-year-old post-conviction case all over again.
In addition, Mr. Menzies' hands are not clean. As detailed in point IIB, Mr. Menzies
personally abused the discovery process during the post-conviction proceedings.
Under these circumstances, it would not be just to allow Mr. Menzies to return to the
ten-year-old starting point of the state post-conviction case. If the Court reverses, it should limit
any 60(b) relief to setting aside the summary judgment and discovery sanctions order.
VII.

T H E RULE 60(b) COURT DID N O T VIOLATE SALT LAKE LEGAL
DEFENDER
ASS'N. V. UNO A N D MR. MENZIES HAS N O T
DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS COURT SHOULD EXPAND T H E
DOCUMENT-DESTRUCTION ORDER.
The rule 60(b) court allowed both parties to conduct appropriate discovery for the rule

60(b) evidentiary hearing (R. 3339-41). Mr. Menzies asserted that some of the documents that
respondent requested were privileged.

The rule 60(b) court ordered them produced for

purposes of the rule 60(b) evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the court ordered respondent
to return the originals and destroy all working copies. On appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that the
rule 60(b) court violated Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997). He

Bundy v. DeLand for the policy statement. Bundy was an appeal from the denial of relief in a
first post-conviction petition. Bundy v. Deland 763 P.2d at 804.
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asks this Court to expand that order to require respondent to search its files for copies of the
same documents that he received from other sources and destroy those copies as well.
A.

Additional relevant facts.
The rule 60(b) court ordered an evidentiary hearing, initially limited to communications

between Mr. Menzies and Mr. Brass (R. 3172-73). To prepare for the January 15,2004, hearing,
respondent served a request to produce all documents related to communications with all of his
prior post-conviction counsel (R. 3345-46). At a hearing on January 7,2004, the rule 60(b) court
ruled that "[i]f either side believes that evidence is relevant to this hearing, the Court suggests
that you produce the documents, you subpoena the witnesses, and then you present the evidence
as you deem appropriate, and the Court will heat objections and rule on them on a question-andobjection basis

the Court reminds counsel again that the scope of the hearing can be as wide

or as narrow as you deem appropriate." (R. 4127:15).
Mr. Menzies filed no objection to respondent's document request until January 5, 2004
(R. 3495-00).43 He did not move for a protective order and permission to file documents under
seal until that date (R. 3510-12). The evidentiary hearing was already scheduled for a date sooner
than the time to respond his Mr. Menzies' motion (R. 4127:5). At the hearing on January 7,
2004, respondent requested a continuance of the evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of the
withheld documents prior to the hearing. Id. Mr. Menzies objected to the request for a

43

The objection included an index of approximately forty withheld documents (R.
3496-99).
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continuance, and the request was denied (R. 4127:6).44
After a discussion about the withheld documents, counsel for Mr. Menzies said: "If there
were a way to give the State this information for purposes of this hearing, and say you can't use
this information for any other reason, I would feel perfectly comfortable giving it to them." (R.
4127:17). She also said: 'Tour Honor, we are willing for [counsel for Respondent] to review all
the documents I am withholding. We don't want them shown to anyone else and we don't want
them photocopied. But, in good faith, we will show her those documents." (R. 4127:20).
The rule 60(b) court ordered Mr. Menzies to turn over all of the withheld documents (R.
4127: 23-24). It further ordered that "For the purposes of the January 15, 2004 hearing, those
documents will be used only by counsel representing the respondent and only for the purposes
of preparing and conducting the January 15 hearing," and the originals would be keptintact and
returned to Mr. Menzies. It deferred ruling on what would happen to any working copies until
the appropriate time. (R 4127:22-24.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Menzies objected to respondent referring to disputed
documents offered as Exhibits A, B, C, and D (R. 4125:104-106). The parties were given an
opportunity to put their arguments and objections on the record (R. 4125:115-119; 4126:127131).45 The court took the matter under advisement over night, to re-read Uno, and conduct an
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Following Mr. Menzies's objection to any continuance, and after the motion for a
continuance to resolve the issue concerning the motion for a protective order was denied,
the rule 60(b) court stated that it would not take anything in camera or anything off the
record (EL 4127 at 8).
4

Respondent objected to any reliance on Uno, arguing that by objecting to a
continuance so that the issue could be properly briefed and resolved, Mr. Menzies waived
any privilege claim he had to those documents (R. 4126:127). Respondent also argued that
47

in-camera review of Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4125:106; R. 4126:123-26).
The rule 60(b) court ruled that the four documents in exhibits A through D were not
admissible and ordered respondent, at the conclusion of the hearing to shred any copies of them.
Id.46 The court also ruled, however, that "[i]n the event that counsel for the respondent chooses
to pursue questioning that may have its basis in Exhibits A through D, the Court requests that
counsel come to the bench for a side bar, we will discuss it, and then the questioning will
proceed on a question-and-an opportunity-to-object basis for each question" (R. 4126:125).
Respondent's counsel proceeded as the court ordered.47
B.

The rule 60(b) court did not violate Uno* and Mr. Menzies cites no authority for requiring
respondent to destroy documents he received from sources other than Mr. Menzies.
Mr. Menzies waived any claim that Uno barred production of the challenged documents.

First, he affirmatively waived it when he stated his willingness to produce the documents under
conditions that would prevent public disclosure of the information in them. The rule 60(b)
court followed the procedure Mr. Menzies considered acceptable. He cannot fault the rule 60(b)

Mr. Menzies had put Exhibits A through D in issue, thereby waiving any privilege, by relying
on information from those documents to support his Rule 60(b) motion (R. 4126:129).
46

Mr. Menzies falsely asserts that Respondent failed to comply with the court's order
(Menzies brief at 47). The record cite he refers to is his own counsel's statement as to
whether Respondent had complied, during argument concerning destruction of all of the
documents on the index - not simply Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4134:46), which were the
only items the court ordered destroyed immediately following the hearing.
47

Menzies falsely implies that respondent violated the court's order by stating that
counsel used information from various documents from the index "at time [sic] approaching
the bench before referring to these matters, and at times not (Menzies brief at 46). However,
the court had not ordered counsel to approach the bench as to questions about every
document from the index. The court only required counsel to first approach the bench
before asking questions specifically about Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4126:125).
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court for taking the path that he suggested. See, e.& State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah
1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
Second, he raised no timely privilege claim. He first raised the privilege issue too close
to the evidentiary hearing to give respondent an adequate opportunity to address it.

He

succeeded in preventing a continuance in order to give respondent that opportunity.
Moreover, even if the rule 60(b) court should not have ordered Mr. Menzies to produce
those documents, he cites no authority to show that the rule 60(b) court abused its discretion
when it denied the extraordinary relief he requests. Mr. Menzies asks this Court to require
respondent "to identify the documents from the index for which [he] claims to have an
independent source" and destroy those documents. Appellant's Brief at 48. The rule 60(b)
court specifically declined to grant this relief. The rule 60(b) court properly determined that "[i]f
they [respondent] had information from an independent source and have developed that
information, this Court does not have the authority to compel them to shred and destroy and
cease referring to that information." (R. 4134:47).48
On April 5, 2004, the court signed a written order which stated that the order to shred
and destroy "does not apply to documents or copies of documents that were already in
respondent's possession, or that were or may be provided to respondent from some other source
(even though they might be duplicates of items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD
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Menzies acknowledges that the court did not arely heavily" on information from
documents he listed on his index of allegedly privileged items, but points out that the court
referred to a journal entry (Menzies brief at 48, n. 83). However, it was counsel for Menzies
who introduced the journal as Exhibit 21 and who asked that a redacted copy be admitted
(R. 4126:158-160).
49

DOCUMENTS) 5 ' (R. 3900-01).
Mr. Menzies cites no authority for his position that respondent should be required to
identify and destroy documents received from an independent source, and this Court should not
order it to do so.49 If respondent attempts to use any documents in the future that Menzies
believes are privileged, Menzies may raise an objection at that time.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued, Mr. Menzies has not proven that the rule 60(b) court improperly
declined to set aside the post-conviction judgment against him. If the Court disagrees, it should
limit any relief to setting aside the unopposed summary judgment and sanctions order.
DATED August 29, 2005.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

)MAS BRUNK
ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorneys General
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In addition, Respondent could not do so unless Menzies is ordered to provide the
documents to Respondent again. Respondent complied with the rule 60(b) court's order,
therefore, it has no documents that Menzies claims are privileged to compare to the other
documents in its files.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that, on August 29,2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S
BRIEF was mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to Mr. Menzies' counsel, EIZABETH
HUNT L.L.C., ELIZABETH HUNT, at 569 Browning Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84105.
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Addenda

Addendum A

A m e n d m e n t VI.

Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 2 0 2 . Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty
cases
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and
sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the
record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the
death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the
conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants.
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record
regarding the defendant's indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is
indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised
on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the
court may accept the rejection.
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in
providing the representation provided for in this section shall be paid from
state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established pursuant
to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

RULE 8. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and if indigent, has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant
faces a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty.
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent
defendant who is charged with an offense for which the punishment may be
death, the court shall appoint two or more attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record based on the requirements set forth
below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel
who are under consideration for appointment have met the following minimum
requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys t must have tried to verdict six
felony cases within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or
co-counsel in a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and
which went to final verdict;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course or
courses at least eight hours of which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of
death penalty cases; and
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than
five years in the active practice of law.
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the
court should also consider at least the following factors:
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital case;
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time
and support and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the
defendant in the capital case now pending before the court with undivided
loyalty to the defendant;
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the
active practice of criminal law in the past five years;
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered;
and
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to
be appointed will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the
defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court
shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and
shall make a finding that counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To
be found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to death, the
combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony
appeals; and
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past
five years an approved continuing legal education course which deals, in
substantial part, with the trial or appeal of death penalty cases.

(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent
petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a), the court shall
appoint one or more attorneys to represent such petitioner at post-conviction
trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. To
be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must
meet the following requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at
least three felony or post-conviction appeals;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or
co-counsel in a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or
otherwise demonstrated proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed
or taught within the past five years an approved continuing legal education
course which dealt, in substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death
penalty cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction proceedings
in death penalty cases;
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or
verdict three civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases
total; and
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not
less than five years in the active practice of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set
forth in this rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed
counsel ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described
in Chapter 32 of Title 77.
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c).

R U L E 12. MOTIONS
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion,
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court.
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned
"Request to Submit for Decision/' The Request to Submit for Decision shall
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served,
and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the motion will
not be submitted for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to
trial by written motion.
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the
pendency of the proceeding;
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed;
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to
Utah Code Section 76-3-402, shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten
days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense
pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402 may be raised at any time after
sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate prosecuting
entity.
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall:
(d)(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;
(d)(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them.
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and
at the hearing.

(e) A motion made before trial shsill be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state
its findings on the record.
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
(g) Except injustices' courts', a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions
of law as are made orally.
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

RULE 6 0 . RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

RULE 2 0 1 . JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AD JUDICATIVE FACTS
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c)
ed or
(d)
party

When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requestnot.
When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
and supplied with the necessary information.

(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A parly is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing" Jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct
the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel.
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section
permitted to withdraw by the court or, due
disability, is unable to continue, the attorney
only for the actual work performed to the date of
certified by the court.

78-35a-202 is
to death or
shall be paid
withdrawal as

(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's
improper conduct or the court finds that a foreseeable conflict
of interest which should have been disclosed prior to appointment
existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be
repaid to the Division of Finance.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner,
:
vs.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Respondent,

ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Judge Raymond S. Uno

:
Case No. 950902713HC

The Court held a hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
on December 22, 1998.
Edward K. Brass.

Petitioner was present and represented by

Respondent Hank Galetka was represented by

Assistant Attorneys General J. Frederic Voros, Jr. and Angela K.
Micklos.

The Court heard argument and took the matter under

advisement.

The Court having reviewed the papers submitted by

counsel, reviewed the file and records of the case, and heard
oral argument on the motion,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The claims asserted in subparagraphs G) 1 through 71 of

the Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction
Relief are dismissed.
2.

The Court finds that the claims identified in paragraph

1 of this order have been previously adjudicated on direct appeal
and on the petition for rehearing, and that no unusual
circumstances exist to permit the Court to grant a hearing on any
laimg.
of these clair
>: J(IaaKtSry
DATED:
antlSfy

C"
^
,

If
1999

BY THE CC

Approved as to form

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner,
v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Respondent.

FINDING OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
UTAH R. CIV. P. 37
SANCTIONS
Judge Raymond S. Uno
Case No. 950902713HC

The Court, having reviewed the papers counsel submitted,
enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order granting respondent's Motion for Utah R. Civ. P. 3 7
Sanctions.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On April 5, 1995, pro bono counsel, Ms. Mary Corporon,

appeared to represent petitioner in this collateral challenge to

his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence.
2.

On April 26, 1995, Ms. Corporon filed petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief.
3.

On May 2, 1995, Ms. Corporon filed petitioner's Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief.
4.

On May 3, 1995, three additional pro bono counsel

appeared to represent petitioner: Mr. Alan Sullivan, Mr. Todd
Shaughnessy, and Mr. Matthew Durham, all lawyers with Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.
5.

On December 13, 1995, irespondent moved for permission to

conduct discovery.
6.

On May 6, 1996, the Court granted respondent permission

to conduct discovery.
7.

On May 17, 1996, respondent served his First Set of

Interrogatories to Petitioner.
8.

On June 12, 1996, the Court awarded petitioner $2,000

for an investigator.
9.

On August 23, 1996, respondent moved for the Court's

leave to depose petitioner.
10.

Respondent filed a motion to compel petitioner's

answers to respondent's first interrogatories.

In October 1996,

the Court granted respondent's motion to compel and ordered
petitioner to serve his answers to respondent's first
2

interrogatories by October 9, 1996.

The Court also granted

respondent's motion to depose petitioner.
11.

On October 22, 1996, when petitioner did not answer the

first interrogatories, respondent moved for sanctions.
12.

On January 9, 1997, before the Court ruled on the

motion for sanctions, petitioner served his answers to the first
interrogatories.

Petitioner has never supplemented those

responses.
13.

As of July 1, 1997, the legislature provided petitioner

funds for an investigator and attorneys fees.
14.

On October 24, 1997, and December 15, 1997, petitioner

requested appointment of paid counsel qualified under Utah R.
Crim. P. 8.
15.

On February 19, 1998, the Court appointed petitioner's

present counsel.
16.
24, 1998.

Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition on August
The second amended petition added an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim and three substantive claims related
to the jury that convicted him.
17.

Respondent scheduled petitioner's deposition for

December 10, 1998.

On December 9, 1998, petitioner's counsel

notified respondent's counsel that petitioner refused to be
deposed.

Petitioner offered no legal reason for his refusal.
3

18.

On December 21, 1998, respondent moved to compel

petitioner's deposition.

Petitioner did not respond to the

motion to compel.
19.

On June 11, 1999, the Court granted the motion to

compel.
20.

Respondent rescheduled petitioner's deposition for

November 5, 1999.

On November 4, 1999, petitioner's counsel

informed respondent's counsel that petitioner would not cooperate
in the deposition.

Petitioner's counsel stated that petitioner

believed he should not be deposed while he still had time during
the discovery period to investigate his claims.
21.

Respondent's counsel appeared for the deposition at the

scheduled date and time.

Petitioner appeared with counsel.

Petitioner initially refused to answer questions.
reason, petitioner responded, "I don't know.

When asked his

Don't want to."

The deposition ultimately terminated at petitioner's request
based on his claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination prohibited any questions about his
communications with his criminal trial counsel.
22.
3, 1999.

Respondent filed a second motion to compel on December
Respondent challenged the legal sufficiency of

petitioner's claim that the Fifth Amendment prohibited deposing
petitioner.
4

23.

Petitioner did not respond to the motion.

24.

On March 13, 2000, the Court granted the second motion

to compel the deposition.
25.

Respondent concluded petitioner's deposition on June 1,

26.

In a letter dated August 14, 2000, respondent asked

2000.

petitioner to supplement his January 9, 1997, answers to
respondent's first interrogatories, detailing several
deficiencies in the initial answers. Respondent's counsel further
stressed the need for the responses before deposing the attorneys
petitioner claimed represented him ineffectively.
27.

By letter dated September 14, 2 000, respondent enclosed

a stipulation for additional interrogatories.

Respondent also

agreed that petitioner could provide the supplemental answers to
the original discovery with his responses to the additional
discovery.
28.

On October 2, 2000, when petitioner failed to sign and

return the stipulation for additional interrogatories, respondent
moved for permission to serve the additional interrogatories.
29.

After the Court granted respondent permission to serve

the additional interrogatories, respondent served them, along
with his first request for production of documents, on December
18, 2000.

Petitioner's responses were due January 17, 2001.
5

30.

Petitioner did not respond to the second

interrogatories or first production requests.

Petitioner also

provided no supplemental responses to the first interrogatories
as respondent requested.
31.

On January 24, 2001, respondent hand-delivered a letter

to petitioner's counsel.

The letter requested petitioner to

answer all outstanding discovery by February 9, 2001.

The letter

further stated respondent would file a motion to compel if
petitioner did not provide the answers.
32.

Petitioner did not respond to the January 24, 2 001,

letter.
33.
compel.

On February 15, 2001, respondent filed a motion to
Respondent moved for an order compelling completed

responses to his first set of interrogatories and responses to
his second set of interrogatories and document production
request.
34.

Petitioner did not respond to the February 15, 2001,

motion to compel.
35.

In its March 2 8th Order, the Court, among other things:

1) concluded that petitioner's answers to respondent's first
interrogatories were deficient as detailed in respondent's
memorandum and incorporated respondent's recitation of the
deficiencies; 2) concluded that petitioner had not responded
6

timely to the second interrogatories and document production
requests; and 3) concluded that petitioner had ample time
available to complete his investigation; consequently, petitioner
should have the information necessary to answer the discovery
readily available.

Based on its findings and conclusions, the

Court ordered petitioner to provide the discovery responses
"forthwith."
36.

Petitioner did not comply with the Court's March 28,

2 001, order compelling discovery.
37.

On April 19, 2 0 01, respondent moved for Utah R. Civ. P.

37 sanctions.

Respondent asked the Court to prohibit petitioner

from introducing any evidence to support his claims beyond that
already in the record and disclosed in the discovery to date.
38.

Petitioner never responded to the sanctions motion.

39.

Petitioner has never voluntarily complied with his

discovery obligations.

Instead, when petitioner has provided

discovery, he has done so only after at least one order
compelling him to do so and sometimes only after respondent has
moved for sanctions when he has not complied with orders
compelling discovery.

Petitioner has ignored the Court's latest

order compelling discovery responses.

7

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The 1997 version of Utah R. Civ. P. 37 governs this case

because petitioner commenced the action before the 1999
amendments became effective.
2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) and (d) (1997) permit sanctions

when a party fails to respond timely to interrogatories and
document production requests or when the party refuses to comply
with an order compelling discovery.
3.

Petitioner has not responded timely to the written

discovery and has refused to comply with the Court's March 28,
2 0 01, order compelling discovery.

Each independently supports

imposing sanctions against petitioner.
4.
just."

Rule 37 permits the Court to grant sanctions "as are
It includes as a suggested sanction "an order refusing to

allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence."

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (B)

(1997) .
5.

Petitioner has: 1) willfully refused to cooperate in

discovery; and 2) engaged in persistent dilatory tactics.

Each

independently supports imposing sanctions against petitioner.
6.

Petitioner has willfully refused to cooperate in

discovery because he has intentionally refused to respond to
8

legitimate discovery requests and disobeyed the Court's orders
compelling discovery.

The record establishes that petitioner's

failure to cooperate was not involuntary.
7.

The facts found above demonstrate petitioner's

persistent delay tactics in the discovery process.
8.

Petitioner's willfulness and delay tactics have

frustrated respondent's legitimate attempts to discover the
complete evidentiary and legal bases for petitioner's claims.
9.

Respondent's requested relief - prohibiting petitioner

from providing any evidence to support his claims beyond that in
the existing record and discovery responses to date - is just
under the circumstances.
10.

Respondent's April 19, 2001, motions for sanctions is

unopposed and meritorious.

9

ORDER
Based on the above findings and conclusions,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Respondent's April 19, 2001, Motion for Utah R. Civ. P.

3 7 Sanctions is GRANTED.
2.

Petitioner is prohibited from supporting his claims with

any evidence beyond that already contained in the existing record
and in his discovery responses to date.
DATED
BY THE COURT:

RAYMOND S. UNO
B /F'^^A*
Third District Court Judge i/w^^'t^i
^X

>.^=

.'"9-

^^^a1^'" •

Approved as to form:

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner,
v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State
Prison Warden,
Respondent.

UNDISPUTED FACTS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT
Judge Raymond S. Uno
Case No. 950902713HC

On October 29, 2001, respondent filed a summary judgment
motion and supporting memorandum asking the Court to dismiss
petitioner's remaining claims with prejudice and enter final
judgment in respondent's favor.

Petitioner filed no response.

Having reviewed the papers filed on the summary judgment
motion, the Court: 1) finds that, for purposes of the motion, the
parties do not dispute the facts recited in respondent's

memorandum supporting his summary judgment motion; 2) makes the
conclusions of law recited below; and 3) grants respondent's
summary judgment motion, dismisses the petition with prejudice,
and enters judgment in respondent's favor.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Respondent's memorandum supporting his summary judgment
motion recites 14 0 paragraphs of facts that respondent does not
dispute for purposes of this motion.

Respondent relied on the

record from the underlying criminal proceeding and the discovery
conducted in this case, including petitioner's deposition
testimony.

Respondent reserved his right to challenge the

ultimate veracity of the facts recited.
Petitioner filed no response to the summary judgment
memorandum.

In addition, the Court previously granted

respondent's discovery sanctions motion and entered an order
prohibiting petitioner from supporting his claims with any
evidence beyond that already contained in the existing record and
in the discovery responses provided prior to the sanctions order.
Therefore, the Court finds that, for purposes of this
summary judgment motion, the parties do not dispute the facts
recited in respondent's statement of undisputed material facts,
adopts that fact statement, and incorporates it by this
reference.
2

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
1.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires the Court to enter

judgment for a party when, on the undisputed material facts, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
JURY CLAIMS
2.

Petitioner claims that the State denied him his state

and federal constitutional right to a fair jury trial because: 1)
someone "tampered with the jury in an effort to deny the
petitioner of the jury he and his counsel selected;" 2) "voir
dire was not adequately conducted;" and 3) the Court improperly
excused "a juror or jurors."
3.

Petitioner may not relitigate in post-conviction

proceedings claims that failed on direct appeal; the Court must
dismiss such claims as an abuse of the writ.
4.

Petitioner also may not litigate in post-conviction

proceedings claims that he could have, but did not raise on
direct appeal unless he demonstrates unusual circumstances
excusing the failure.
5.
appeal.

Petitioner raised a jury-tampering claim on direct
To the extent petitioner's post-conviction jury-

tampering claim repeats his direct appeal claim, petitioner
abuses the writ by bringing it.
6.

Petitioner could have, but did not raise on direct
3

appeal his claims concerning voir dire and excusing jurors.

To

the extent petitioner's post-conviction jury-tampering claim
differs from his direct appeal jury-tampering claim, petitioner
also could have, but did not raise that claim on direct appeal.
Petitioner has identified no unusual circumstances justifying the
failure to raise these claims on direct appeal.

Therefore, the

Court must dismiss the claims as procedurally barred.
7.

The procedural dispositions in paragraphs 2 through 5

provide bases for dismissing the substantive jury challenges in
claim 73 independent of the claim's merits.
8.

Alternatively, petitioner's substantive, post-conviction

jury challenges fail on their merits.

State post-conviction

proceedings provide a remedy only for substantial denials of
constitutional rights during the underlying criminal trial.

The

only constitutional right petitioner had with respect to the jury
was the right to trial by an impartial jury.

None of

petitioner's jury tampering claims allege a deprivation of a
constitutional right.
9.

Petitioner asserts that someone attempted to tamper with

the jury to deprive him of the jury he selected.

Petitioner had

no right to a particular jury; only the right to an impartial
jury.

In addition, an attempt to tamper with the jury

demonstrates no deprivation of a constitutional right.
4

Finally,

the Court dismissed the juror who received outside information,
and the juror shared it with none of the other jurors before the
Court excused him.

The record clearly demonstrates that the

"attempt" did not affect petitioner's right to an impartial jury.
10.

Petitioner also attacks the voir dire's adequacy and

claims that the Court improperly excused jurors.

The allegations

are insufficient as a matter of law to justify post-conviction
relief: neither address the ultimate issue of whether a biased
juror sat.
11.

On the basis of the undisputed facts, respondent is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on petitioner's claim 73
on the independent bases that the claim is procedurally barred,
and that it fails on its merits.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: GENERAL
12.

Petitioner challenges the constitutional adequacy of

his representation at the guilt and penalty phases.

Petitioner

claims: 1) trial counsel did not obtain petitioner's prison file
prior to the penalty phase, even though counsel had advance
notice the State planned to call a witness to verify petitioner's
record (claim 72a); 2) trial counsel developed insufficient
evidence to impeach Walter Britton, and specifically failed to
demonstrate that Mr. Britton's statement to police tracked media
reports exactly (claims 72b and g ) ; 3) counsel failed to
5

investigate petitioner's alibi that he was attempting to meet
with his parole officer at the time of the murder (claim 72c); 4)
counsel failed to present evidence that Ms. Hunsaker purportedly
had a history of repeatedly absconding from employment and from
her husband (claim d ) ; 5) counsel insufficiently investigated
facts that would have identified someone else as the murderer
(claim e ) ; and 6) counsel purportedly conducted no significant
penalty phase investigation (claim f ) .
13.

In order to succeed on these claims, petitioner has the

burden of proving two elements.

First, he must identify the

specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

To meet his burden on this element,

petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance.

The Court must give counsel wide

latitude to make tactical decisions and may not question
strategic decisions unless no reasonable basis exists for them.
14.

The Court accepts the Tenth Circuit's articulation of

the first element that respondent cites in his brief: petitioner
must establish that his counsel's decisions were "completely
See, e.g., Boyd

unreasonable, not merely wrong."

F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999), cert, denied,
(2000) .

v. Ward,

179

528 U.S. 1167

Therefore, petitioner must establish that counsel failed

to do what the constitution compelled, not just what may have
6

been prudent or appropriate.

He cannot succeed merely by showing

that counsel's choices appear ill-advised in hindsight.
15.

Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to effective

representation also entitled him to counsel who would reasonably
investigate the case facts.

However, that right did not entitle

petitioner to the investigation that the best criminal defense
lawyer would have conducted when supplied with unlimited time and
resources, and with the benefit of hindsight.

As with tactical

decisions about what evidence to present, the Court must assess
counsel's investigation decisions with a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments.

In addition, the

reasonableness of counsel's investigation decisions depends
critically upon what petitioner told them.
16.

The second element requires petitioner to prove that

the challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence in the
outcome of his criminal trial.

To challenge his death sentence

successfully, petitioner must establish a reasonable probability
that the sentencer would have struck the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in petitioner's favor.
17.

Petitioner has the burden of proving both elements; the

failure to prove either element independently defeats an
individual claim.

With respect to counsel's investigation

decisions at both phases, petitioner's burden requires him to
7

demonstrate that evidence existed that counsel failed to find as
a result of constitutionally deficient investigation.
18.

The Court's prior orders prohibited petitioner from

presenting additional evidence; therefore, he must meet his
burden, if at all, on the existing record.
19.

As detailed in the following subsections, petitioner

cannot, as a matter of law, meet his burden to prove either
element on any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Therefore, respondent is entitled to summary judgment.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: PRISON RECORD (claim 72a)
20.

Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed

constitutionally deficiently by failing to obtain his prison file
prior to the penalty phase.

According to petitioner, his counsel

should have known the State would rely on the file because it
listed a witness to verify petitioner's "record."
21.

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that counsel

relied on her experience as a criminal defense attorney in
relation to the witness listed to verify petitioner's record.
When the State proffered petitioner's entire prison file, counsel
explained that, in her experience, witnesses called to
authenticate prison records only authenticated prior convictions.
She argued that identifying a witness to authenticate
petitioner's record therefore gave her insufficient notice that
8

the State would rely on the entire file, including prison
disciplinary and progress reports, at the penalty phase.
22.

Petitioner has no evidence to demonstrate that counsel

unreasonably assessed what aggravation the import of calling a
witness to authenticate petitioner's record.

Petitioner must

prove that counsel's assessment was unreasonable at the time she
concluded the State intended to offer only petitioner's prior
convictions as aggravation evidence.

That subsequent events

proved counsel made a mistake does not satisfy petitioner's
burden.

Trial counsel's unrebutted assertion that, in her

experience, proving petitioner's record meant only proving his
prior convictions defeats the first ineffective assistance
element.
23.

On this record, petitioner also cannot prove to a

"demonstrable reality" that the Court would have struck the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
petitioner's favor if counsel had obtained the file sooner.
24.

First, counsel secured the Court's agreement not to

review the file until defense counsel reviewed it.
then gave counsel time to review the file.

The Court

The reasonable

inference from the record is that counsel had all the time they
needed.

Counsel never objected that the time allotted was

insufficient.

After calling the last defense witness, counsel
9

informed the Court that any further defense evidence would depend
on the prison file contents.

The only remaining evidence then

offered was petitioner's unsworn letter expressing his
condolences to the family and professing his innocence.
25.

Second, defense counsel attacked the reliability of

negative information in the file.

Trial counsel called a witness

who explained that inmates often had no opportunity to respond to
allegations in disciplinary reports, and that the prison did not
always follow up on the allegations.

The State presented no

rebuttal evidence.
26.

Third, trial counsel argued mitigating evidence from

the file, including that: 1) petitioner supported his family with
his prison job income; 2) petitioner had excelled academically in
prison; and 3) petitioner followed his superiors' orders,
mediated between inmates and staff, and showed loyalty and
kindness to those who treated petitioner with respect.

When it

imposed sentence, the Court specifically noted that the prison
files contained "quite a few" positive entries.
27.

Finally, petitioner has not and cannot produce evidence

that counsel would have offered at the penalty phase but for
their failure to obtain the file sooner.

Without such evidence,

petitioner's assertion of prejudice is mere speculation.
cannot prove that the evidentiary picture would have been
10

He

different at all, let alone meet his burden to prove a reasonable
likelihood that the Court would have balanced the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in petitioner's favor.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: WALTER BRITTON TESTIMONY (claims 72b and

a!
28.

Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed

deficiently because they did not develop evidence to establish
that Mr. Britton's testimony tracked media accounts of Ms.
Hunsaker's murder.

In a separate claim, he generally asserts

that counsel failed to develop and present "evidence which would
have impeached and discredited Walter Britton."

In discovery

responses, petitioner also complains that David Kling attempted
to contact counsel to discredit Mr. Britton, and that counsel did
not investigate Mr. Kling's offer.
29.

Petitioner cannot prove counsel insufficiently

developed evidence to attack Mr. Britton's credibility.

Counsel

developed evidence Mr. Britton only agreed to testify when he
thought his testimony would net him some benefit in his federal
bank robbery prosecutions or requests for prison transfers, but
refused to testify when he believed he would obtain no benefit.
30.

Petitioner also cannot demonstrate any constitutional

deficiency in counsel's investigation of Mr. Kling.

Although

LDA's files contained a letter in which Mr. Kling purportedly

11

agreed to discredit Mr. Britton's testimony, petitioner has no
proof that Mr. Kling wrote the letter, or that counsel failed to
investigate the offer Mr. Kling purportedly made.

Petitioner

cannot prove the factual predicate for this part of his claim.
31.

Even assuming Mr. Kling offered to testify on

petitioner's behalf and that counsel did nothing to investigate
the offer, petitioner still cannot demonstrate counsel performed
objectively unreasonably.

To the contrary, counsel could have

legitimately concluded that the risks of calling Mr. Kling far
outweighed any benefit.

Counsel knew that Mr. Kling, like Mr.

Britton, reported to police that petitioner confessed to killing
Ms. Hunsaker.

Mr. Kling's account of petitioner's confession

corroborated Mr. Britton's on many details, including that: 1)
petitioner slit Ms. Hunsaker's throat; 2) he murdered her so she
could not testify about the Gas-A-Mat robbery; 3) petitioner kept
Ms. Hunsaker's identification; and 4) petitioner told the other
inmates to watch the news broadcast about the murder.

In

addition, Mr. Kling provided police with petitioner's only
admission that he hid Ms. Hunsaker's identification at the jail.
If counsel had called Mr. Kling to attack Mr. Britton's veracity,
the State could have impeached Mr. Kling with his prior statement
that corroborated Mr. Britton's on many details.
32.

Alternatively, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any
12

error undermines confidence in the guilt verdict.

Petitioner has

no proof that Mr. Britton's testimony actually tracked media
accounts.

In any event, counsel argued without contradiction

that Mr. Britton could have discovered all the information to
which he testified through the media.
33.

Similarly, petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel's

omission of Mr. Kling's testimony undermines confidence in the
jury's verdict.

Petitioner has no admissible proof that Mr.

Kling would have attacked Mr. Britton's credibility if counsel
had called him in 1988.

Petitioner has no proof that Mr. Kling

sent the letter in which he purports to offer to testify that Mr.
Britton and Mr. Benitez fabricated petitioner's confession.
Similarly, petitioner's reliance on a triple hearsay account of
an unidentified investigator who reported that, in 1995, Legal
Defender Associations's 1988 investigator told him that Mr. Kling
contacted LDA and offered to tell the truth cannot support his
claim.
34.

In addition, petitioner concedes that he does not know

how Mr. Kling would testify today.

Mr. Kling may deny ever

offering to testify on petitioner's behalf.

He may deny that he

sent any letter to counsel or otherwise contacted counsel's
office with such an offer.

He may have stood by his police

statement and corroborated petitioner's confessions to Mr.
13

Britton with an account of similar confessions to him.
35.

Finally, even without Mr. Britton 7 s testimony, the

State proved petitioner's guilt with overwhelming, albeit
circumstantial evidence.
from the Gas-A-Mat.

Petitioner lived three to four blocks

Police found Ms. Hunsaker's thumbprint in

the car petitioner had in his possession at the time she
disappeared.

Police found Ms. Hunsaker's identification in a

jail room to which petitioner ran after the booking officer asked
for petitioner's belongings.

Police found Ms. Hunsaker's social

security card in petitioner's girlfriend's belongings.
found Ms. Hunsaker's purse at petitioner's house.

Police

Carpet fibers

found on Ms. Hunsaker's clothes matched the lime green shag
carpeting from petitioner's apartment.

At petitioner's

direction, Mr. Denter retrieved approximately the same amount of
cash from petitioner's apartment that was stolen from the Gas-AMat.

A witness identified a photograph of petitioner as the most

like a man he saw at the murder scene wearing a coat similar to
petitioner's and in the company of a woman wearing clothes
similar to those found on Ms. Hunsaker's body.

Petitioner's

knives could have been used to nearly decapitate Ms. Hunsaker.
Ms. Hunsaker's murderer may have used handcuffs to bind her to a
tree; petitioner possessed handcuffs.

Even without Mr. Britton's

testimony that petitioner confessed to killing Ms. Hunsaker, all
14

the evidence pointed to petitioner.

Evidence further impeaching

Mr. Britton would have made no difference.

Petitioner cannot, as

a matter of law, demonstrate that its omission undermines
confidence in the outcome.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: ALIBI EVIDENCE (claim 72c)
36.

Petitioner asserts he attempted to see his parole

officer on the morning of the murder, then went to job services.
37.

Petitioner acknowledges that counsel investigated his

parole office alibi and discovered he did not see his parole
officer on the morning of the murder.

He further acknowledges

that he did not in fact see his parole officer that morning.

He

claims, however, that he could not see his parole officer the
morning of the murder because the parole office held an
unscheduled, emergency meeting.

Petitioner contends that, had

counsel developed that evidence, it would have corroborated his
version that he at least went to the office because he otherwise
would not have known about the emergency meeting.
38.

On this record, petitioner cannot overcome the

presumption of constitutionally adequate representation with
respect to the alleged parole office alibi.

The record

demonstrates that counsel made a strategic decision to omit all
evidence of petitioner's parole status.

That decision

necessarily precluded them from presenting evidence that
15

petitioner attempted to visit his parole officer the morning of
Ms. Hunsaker's murder.
39.

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the decision was

objectively unreasonable; to the contrary, the record
demonstrates that counsel sacrificed a marginal alibi defense to
keep the jury from finding out that petitioner was on parole from
another crime at the time of Ms. Hunsaker's murder.

Petitioner

never explains how the jury would have learned that he knew about
the special meeting: petitioner did not testify at trial and has
never asserted his willingness to do so.
overstates the evidence's significance.
that he knew about the meeting.

Petitioner also
It would have shown only

Attempting to contact his parole

officer by telephone would have provided the same information.
On the other hand, counsel knew that petitioner's parole officer
had questioned all reception personnel and reported to police
that they all denied that petitioner came to the parole office
the morning of the murder.

In other words, the omitted evidence,

at most, would have presented to the jury information that
petitioner could have discovered by telephone, would have
resulted in testimony from all reception personnel that
petitioner did not go to the office the morning of Ms. Hunsaker's
murder, and would have let the jury determining his guilt or
innocence know that he was on parole.
16

40.

On this record, petitioner also cannot overcome the

presumption of constitutionally adequate performance as to the
alleged job services alibi.

First, petitioner gave conflicting

deposition testimony about what investigation he believed counsel
did.

He asserted both that he never knew what counsel did to

investigate the alleged job services alibi, and that he knew they
did nothing.

As to the latter, petitioner asserted counsel told

him they did nothing, but when asked when they told him, he
merely responded, nIt never happened.
41.

They didn't have nothing."

Petitioner also cannot meet his burden with respect to

both alleged alibis because he has no evidence to prove that
either or both stops provided him with a complete alibi.
Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that he had Troy Denter's
car - the car in which police discovered Ms. Hunsaker's thumb
print - until noon the day of Ms. Hunsaker's murder, and that he
drove it approximately 120 miles.

Petitioner has no proof that

he could not have murdered Ms. Hunsaker and made both stops
before returning the car to Mr. Denter.
42.

Alternatively, petitioner cannot prove to a

demonstrable reality that proceeding on the alibis would have
made an acquittal reasonably likely.

First, petitioner cannot

prove at least one of the facts on which he predicates this
claim:

He cannot prove that job services in fact had a record
17

that he visited the morning of the murder.

Moreover, the "alibi"

evidence petitioner claims counsel should have presented did not
prove that he could not have muirdered Maureen Hunsaker.

On the

other hand, the other circumstantial evidence overwhelminglyproved that petitioner did kill her.

On these undisputed facts,

petitioner cannot prove to a demonstrable reality that counsel's
decisions undermine confidence in the outcome.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: INVESTIGATION TO IDENTIFY WHO KILLED MS.
HUNSAKER (claim 72e)
43.

Petitioner claims that trial counsel did not fully

investigate facts that would have suggested someone else murdered
Ms. Hunsaker.

Petitioner's interrogatory answers suggest this

claim duplicates his alibi claim: petitioner explained that
counsel should have investigated whether someone else killed Ms.
Hunsaker because he told counsel he was somewhere else at the
time of her murder.

In his deposition, petitioner added only

that counsel would have found the real killer if they had done
any "reasonable" investigation.
44.

The undisputed facts demonstrate petitioner cannot meet

his burden on either ineffective assistance element for this
claim.

Petitioner admits that he has no evidence to support this

claim beyond that supporting his claim that counsel
insufficiently investigated his alibi defense.

18

Petitioner has

not demonstrated that the constitution required additional
investigation, or that it would have yielded any evidence
suggesting another person may have murdered Ms. Hunsaker, let
alone evidence sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence
of petitioner's guilt.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: VICTIM CHARACTER EVIDENCE (claim 72d)
45.

Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed

deficiently because they did not present evidence that Ms.
Hunsaker "repeatedly abscond[ed] from employment and from her
husband."

Amended Petition at 37.

Petitioner asserts in his

interrogatory answers that Ms. Hunsaker uhad previously 'run
away' from her home and her husband to spend time with men other
than her husband, subsequently giving as an excuse that she had
not done so voluntarily."

Interrogatory Answers at 6.

Petitioner contends the evidence would have cast doubt on the
kidnapping and robbery aggravators, affecting both the homicide
degree and penalty phase aggravating evidence.
46.

As a matter of law, petitioner cannot prove either

ineffective assistance element on this claim.
47.

By his own admission, petitioner has no witnesses or

exhibits to prove that Ms. Hunsaker previously ran away from
family and work to spend time with other men, then claimed she
did not do so voluntarily.

Therefore, he cannot demonstrate what
19

information counsel had that should have led them to investigate
these allegations or that they would have found any support for
them.
48.

The record demonstrates that petitioner's trial counsel

knew the importance of challenging the kidnapping and robbery
aggravators.

Counsel developed evidence and argued from the

defense and State's evidence that the State had not met its
burden to prove either a robbery or kidnapping.

Counsel

emphasized that there were no signs of a struggle in the
cashier's booth.

They developed evidence that Ms. Hunsaker was

unhappy and depressed, making comments about wanting to get away
from her family, involved in a lengthy paternity action, and seen
with a man other than defendant after she disappeared from the
Gas-A-Mat.

At the end of the State's case, counsel moved to

dismiss, arguing that the State provided insufficient evidence to
prove either aggravating circumstance.

With no evidence beyond

that which counsel presented, petitioner cannot meet his burden
to overcome the presumption that counsel did all that the
constitution required.
49.

Alternatively, petitioner cannot meet his burden to

prove that counsel's performance undermines confidence in the
outcome.

As stated, petitioner admits he has no evidence to

support his assertion that Ms. Hunsaker ran away and later
20

claimed she did not leave voluntarily or any other evidence
concerning Ms. Hunsaker's background and mental state beyond that
which his trial counsel actually presented, let alone sufficient
evidence to prove to a demonstrable reality that counsel
overlooked evidence sufficiently compelling to overcome the
State's case.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: PENALTY PHASE INVESTIGATION (claim 72f)
50.

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel conducted no

substantial penalty phase investigation.

Petitioner claims that

trial counsel failed to obtain petitioner's prison file "at all,"
did not object to its contents adequately, and did not argue
mitigating evidence from the file.

He also contends unidentified

additional investigation would have yielded unidentified
information about petitioner's prior abuse and victimization, and
unidentified information to demonstrate Ms. Hunsaker likely left
the Gas-A-Mat voluntarily rather than as the result of robbery or
abduction.
51.

The Court has already ruled that petitioner cannot

demonstrate that counsel should have investigated further whether
Ms. Hunsaker left voluntarily, that they would have found any
additional evidence, or that it would have overcome the State's
evidence establishing that petitioner robbed and kidnapped Ms.
Hunsaker.
21

52.

As a matter of law, petitioner cannot prevail on his

claim assertions concerning his prison file.

First, petitioner's

allegations concerning his prison file rely, in part, on obvious
record misstatements.

Counsel did obtain the file and argued

mitigating evidence from it.
53.

Second, petitioner's challenge to counsel's objections

to admitting the file abuses the writ.

Counsel objected to

admitting the file on numerous grounds, the Court overruled the
objections and admitted the file, and the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the appellate challenge to the Court's rulings.
Petitioner may not relitigate his unsuccessful appellate claim by
recasting it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Because petitioner already litigated this claim, the Court
dismisses it irrespective of its merits.
54.

Alternatively, the supreme court's disposition

forecloses petitioner's ineffective assistance claim.

The

supreme court already determined that, even if error, admitting
the file was harmless because the bad acts evidence in the file
paled in comparison to the admissible aggravating evidence.

That

holding forecloses the ineffective assistance prejudice element.
55.

Petitioner also can prove neither ineffective

assistance element on his challenge to counsel's penalty phase
investigation and presentation.

First, the record demonstrates
22

that trial counsel developed evidence on each of the points
petitioner asserts they should have.

Trial counsel's mitigation

case incorporated: 1) family member testimony and expert
testimony about the abuse petitioner suffered as a child; 2)
expert testimony about how his childhood prevented him from
developing a normal value system; 3) expert testimony that,
although he qualified for an anti-social personality diagnosis,
he possessed personality traits that would assist him in curbing
his anti-social acts; 4) evidence that, with petitioner's record,
he had little chance of ever obtaining parole; 5) evidence that
other inmates serving long sentences had changed their behavior;
6) evidence that petitioner would be housed in the most secure
area of the prison, and that petitioner had escaped only from a
lower security area; 7) evidence concerning his good behavior in
prison; 8) affidavits from seven Utah criminal defense attorneys
that included information about the proportionality of sentencing
petitioner to death; and 9) a letter from petitioner expressing
his remorse.

In addition, counsel argued positive elements from

petitioner's prison file, such as acting as a mediator between
inmates and guards in disputes and complimentary work
evaluations, and the Court expressly acknowledged that the file
contained positive statements about petitioner.
failed to identify any overlooked evidence.
23

Petitioner has

On the other hand,

the State's aggravation case: 1) detailed petitioner's extensive
criminal history, including twice robbing and one time kidnapping
the same 7-11 clerk and robbing and shooting a cab driver who
worked three jobs of his last dollar; 2) provided evidence that
petitioner's girl friend smuggled a screw driver to petitioner in
a secured mental health facility; and 3) relied on the
circumstances of Ms. Hunsaker's murder.

Petitioner has refused

to identify any overlooked evidence, let alone evidence so
compelling that it creates a reasonable likelihood that the Court
would have struck the balance of aggravating and mitigating
evidence in petitioner's favor.

Therefore, the claim fails as a

matter of law.

24

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Based on the papers filed, and on the undisputed facts and
legal conclusions recited above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Respondent's summary judgment motion is GRANTED;

2.

Petitioner's claims 72 and 73 are DISMISSED with

prejudice;
3. As the Court has now denied all of petitioner's postconviction claims, the Court DENIES the petition for postconviction relief, DISMISSES the petition with prejudice, and
orders judgment entered in respondent's favor.
DATED

^Ji/U/*sjQ-&<?

//,

SiOtf^

BY THE COURT:

Raymond S. Uno
District Court Judge,
Approved as to form:
Edward Brass
Counsel for Petitioner
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Addendum E

EDWARD K. BRASS (#432)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5678
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
v.
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Warden

Case No. 950902713
Judge Uno
??fiaA

Respondent.

The petitioner, by his attorney, moves the Court to enter an order setting aside the judgment
entered in this case on or about January 11, 2002, pursuant to Rule 60 (p\ U.R.C.P.
The specific grounds for this motion shall be set forth in a subsequent memorandum.
DATED this j j

day of April, 2002.

Attorney for the Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Thomas B. Brunker
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
Box 140854
Salt Lake UT 84114-0854
DATED this J J L day of April, 2002.

Addendum F

ORIGINAL
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

5
6
7

Petitioner,

Transcript of:

vs.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING
VOLUME II

HANK GALETKA,

8

Case No. 030106629

Respondent.

9
10
11

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN

12
13
14
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD.
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119

15
16
17
18

JANUARY 16, 2004

19
20
21

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

22

SEP 18 2004

FILE® BISTBifiT SOUS!
Third Judicial District

23
24
25

REPORTED BY:
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1

about your own case.

And did you in fact tell Mr. Brass or

2

give him some suggestions of things that you thought should be

3

included in the amended petition?

4

A

I probably did.

5

Q

And did you ask him to provide you with a copy of the

6

I did.

amended petition that he filed?

7

A

I asked him to provide me with a copy of anything he

8

generated or anything the State give him or anything, yes, I

9

did.

10
11

Q

And did he ever give you a copy of the amended

petition?

12

A

No, ma'am.

13

Q

Did you ever talk with Mr. Brass about Troy Denter?

14

A

Nope.

15

MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, if counsel could approach the

16 J bench, we need to discuss one of the issues raLised earlier.
17

THE COURT:

You may.

18

(Off-the-record discussion at the bench.)

19

THE COURT:

The record will reflect that the Court

20 I has conferred with counsel at the bench on matters relating to
21 I examination of the witness.
22 J

Q

And you may proceed.

(By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, you spoke with an

23 I investigator named Ron Lax, didn't you?
24

A

Yes, ma 1 am.

25

Q

Mr. Menzies, in your deposition that you gave on

1

June 1 of 2000, when Mr. Brass was present, and I will give you

2

a copy of that, so that you can refer to it, as well, to

3

refresh your recollection, if you would turn to page 50, and

4

looking down, towards the bottom of page 50, it says, you were

5

asked a question whether you had any other specific information

6

that would identify someone else as the murderer.

7

answered, "Specific information, no."

8

statement of what was said at the deposition?

9
10
11
12
13
14

A

And you

Is that an accurate

I am trying to find where you are at here.

Yeah,

that's pretty accurate.
Q

But that's not the same information that you told

Mr. Lax, is it?
A

Well, I told Mr. Lax to look somewhere else; but,

specifically, I give him some ideas.

15

Q

In fact, didn't you give Mr. Lax a specific name?

16

A

To look at?

17

Q

Mr. Menzies, showing you a copy of what has been

Yes, ma'am.

18

marked as Respondent's Exhibit C, but not admitted as an

19

exhibit yet, if you would read that very first line at the top

20

of the page.

21

line to yourself.

If you would look at page 4, and read that first

22

A

I did.

23

Q

And when you were asked the question at the

24

deposition, if you had specific information that would identify

25

someone else as the murderer, you gave information that was

1

contrary to what you told Mr. Lax, didn't you?

2

A

Yes and no.

3

Q

Well, I guess you better explain yourself, then.

4
5

What do you mean by "yes and no"?
A

If you can't prove something, it is not, you know, if

6

you have got someone to look for something in a certain area,

7

you have them look for it..

8
9

Q

So at the time of your deposition were you saying

that they would not be able to prove that?

10

A

Me?

11

Q

You were asked if you had any specific information

12

that would identify someone else as the murderer?

13

A

No, I can't prove nothing.

14

Q

And you answered no at your deposition?

15

A

And I just answered no again.

16

Q

But that' s different than the information you gave to

17
18

Mr. Lax, isn't it?
A

When I talked to Mr. Lax, it was more of a

19

conversation than giving information.

20

everything.

It was giving ideas and

MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, could we approach the bench

23

THE COURT:

You may.

24

(Off-the-record discussion at the bench.)

25

THE COURT:

21
22

again?

The record will reflect that the Court

1

conferred with counsel at the bench regarding the cross

2

examination of the respondent.

3

Q

You may proceed.

(By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, let me ask you again.

At

4

the deposition you were asked if you had any other information

5

that would identify someone else as the murderer.

6

MS. HUNT:

7

Objection.

Would you use the language

that was used by Mr. Brunker, please.

8

MS. RILEY:

That was Mr. Brunker.

9 I

THE COURT:

Counsel, if you have anything to discuss,

10

make sure you discuss it between you off the record.

11

on the record, direct it to the Court or the witness.

12
13

Anything

(An off-the-record discussion was held.)
Q

(By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, you were asked first the

14

question, "Let me ask it a little more specifically.

15

have any other information that would identify someone else as

16

the murderer?"

17

A

Are you talking about at the deposition?

18

Q

At the deposition, yes.

Did you

And then you went off the

19

record for a moment.

You came back.

Counsel for the State

20

asked again, and said, "I believe the question was whether you

21

had any other specific information that would identify someone

22

else as the murderer."

23

A

OK.

24

Q

And you answered, "Specific information, no"; is that

25

right?

1

A

Yes, ma 1 am, I did.

2

Q

And that's different than what you told Ron Lax,

3

isn't it?

4 J

A

Somewhat, yes.

5

Q

If it is only somewhat, what's the part that's not

6 J different?
7 I

A

Well, when they first asked me this question at the

8

deposition, I talked to Ed Brass about it off the record, as

9

you can see here, when we took a recess.

10 I sentence of death.

I am an ex-convict.

And I am under the
I needed my attorneys

11

to do some investigation instead of just giving you folks what

12

everything we had.

13

didn't have the specific facts, that was just something someone

So when he asked that thing, because I

14 I told me, I took it that way, and that's how I answered it.
15
16

Q

And that's different than what you told Mr. Lax,

isn't it?

17 J

A

Yes, ma'am.

18 I

Q

Thank you.

19

Mr. Menzies, you asked Mary Corporon not

to mention Troy Denter, didn't you?

20

A

No.

21

Q

So you told her not to mention Troy Denter?

22

A

Until she investigated it.

23 J

Q

And do you still have your journal in front of you

24

there?

25

A

I actually told her not to.

Yes, I do.

1

Q

Would you turn to the date that is January 21 of

3

A

Excuse me?

4

Q

January 21, 1996.

5

A

Right.

6

Q

And that's on page 19 of your journal?

7

A

Twenty-one.

8

Q

Whoops, sorry.

2

9

1996.

And you wrote in your journal, "Wrote

Mary C. Corporon and told her that I donf t want anyone

10

connected with my case to mention Troy Denter T s name at all";

11

isn't that correct?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

And you have told us earlier that Mary Corporon sent

14

you copies of all the pleadings in your case.

15

sent you a copy of the interrogatories, and her initial answers

16

to the interrogatories, didn't she?

17

A

18

Q

Let me see if I can help you out a little.

Are we at

Exhibits G and H?

21

THE CLERK:

22
23

I am not being rude.

I just don't remember.

19
20

Does it say that in my journal?

And she also

Q

G and H, that would be correct.

(By Ms. Riley) Showing you a copy of what has been

marked for identification as Exhibit G, does that refresh your

24 I memory as to
25 I

A

—

Yes, that's my writing.

1
2

THE COURT:
Q

You may proceed.

(By Ms . Riley) So, Mr. Menzies, looking at what has

3

been marked for identification as Exhibit G, do> you recall now

4

whether you previously have seen that document?

5

A

Obviously, I have.

6

Q

Would you turn to page 8 of that document.

7

A

I am there.

8

Q

And looking at the answer to interrogatory question

9
10

number it looks like 6(c), there is some information that has
been blocked out there.

11

A

Yes, ma'am.

12

Q

Did you block out that information?

13

A

I think so.

14

MS. HUNT:

Could I interpose an objection at this

15

point?

I am not sure what Mr. Menzies' work with Ms. Corporon

16

on the interrogatories has to do with his communication with

17

Mr. Brass.

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. HUNT:

20

THE COURT:

21
22
23
24
25

Q

What is your objection legally?
Relevance and scope of the hearing.
Overruled.

(By Ms. Riley) I am sorry, Mr. Menzies, did you

answer, yes, you have blocked out that information?
A

I said I think I did, yeah.

It looks like my

initials there.
Q

Do you recall what it was that you blocked out there?

1

A

No.

2

Q

Showing you what has been marked for identification,

But I imagine it is probably about Troy.

3

but not admitted yet, as Exhibit H.

4

answer there.

5

question without the portion blocked out?

6

A

And does that appear to be an answer to the same

Sort of.

7

MS. HUNT:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

Would you look at the

What's your question?
Counsel, if you want to confer, you may.

If you want to make an objection, state it legally, and let's
go back on the record.
Q

Proceed.

(By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, did you understand that

12

these were answers to questions that counsel for the State was

13

asking?

14

A

I guess I understand that, yeah.

15

Q

And in the answer, the proposed answer that Mary

16

Corporon provided to you, before they were given to the State,

17

did you cross off the portion that said, "Others have confessed

18

to or bragged about committing the murder in issue"?

19

A

No, I don't think so.

20

Q

What is it you believe you crossed out there?

21

A

I believe it is to do with the same thing, but they

22

rewrote —

23

same thing that's crossed out.

24

saying?

25

Q

if you notice, they rewrote it.

Right.

It is not just the

Do you understand what I am

You understand that the answers that were

1

provided to the State were corrected or answers made with

2

additions; is that correct?

3

A

ThatT s correct.

4

Q

And is it fair to say that you did not want Mary

5

Corporon to answer to the State that others had confessed to or

6

bragged about the murder in question?

7

A

It would be fair to say that I wanted my attorneys

8

and I expected my attorneys to investigate my case before they

9

handed stuff over to you people to where you could screw it up.

10

Q

So you wanted the version that was given to the State

11

to not say that others had confessed to or bragged about

12

committing the murder?

13

A

Let me read the question, first, would you?

14

Q

Sure.

15

A

Ask me again, would you, please.

16

Q

You wanted the version of the answers to these

17

interrogatories that went to the State not to say that others

18

have confessed to or bragged about committing the murder?

19

A

I wanted my attorneys, pure and simple, to

20

investigate, get information for me, get information, evidence

21

for me before they give stuff to the State, yes, ma 1 am.

22
23

Q

So you didn't want that information to be given to

the State in this interrogatory?

24 I

A

I just answered you.

25

Q

Is that correct?

You didn't want the State to be

1
2
3
4

given that information?
A

No, I didn ! t.

I said until my attorneys had

investigated stuff, no, I did not.
Q

Showing you now what has been marked for

5

identification as State's Exhibit I.

6

document?

Do you recognize that

7

A

I have seen it.

8

Q

It is entitled "Waiver"/ is that correct?

9

A

Yes, ma'am.

10

Q

And this is a waiver that you signed for your trial

11

counsel, Brooke Wells and Frances Palacios; is that correct?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Who did you sign it for?

14

A

Well, I know it is going to sound stupid, but I

15

signed a whole bunch of papers that just had where my name is,

16

because they wanted to get records, they wanted to do

17

everything else, and so I signed a bunch of papers for them.

18

Q

And would you take a look at this document now, then,

19

and see if you recall reading that and if that's what you

20

intended to sign.

21

A

No.

22

Q

No, that's not what you intended to sign?

23

A

Isn't that what I just said?

24

Q

But you did sign it; is that correct?

25

A

Ma'am, it was a blank piece of paper.

I signed a

1 J whole bunch of them.
2
3

Q

So what you are telling ine is that you just signed

your name to a blank piece of paper?

4

A

A whole bunch of them.

5

Q

And then they typed this information in later?

6

A

Yes, ma'am.

7

Q

That's what you are accusing your trial attorneys of

8

doing?

9

A

10
11

Or whoever done it, yeah.
MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, the State would ask that

Exhibit I be admitted.

12

THE COURT: Any objection?

13

MS. HUNT:

14

THE COURT:

15

No objection, your Honor.
It is received.

(Respondent's Exhibit I was received into evidence.)

16

Q

(By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, when you were told that

17

the State wanted to take your deposition, did you want to have

18

your deposition taken?

19 I

A

No, ma1 am.

20

Q

And what were your reasons for why you did not want

21
22

to have your deposition taken?
A

At the time?

They changed over times. But at times,

23

to be perfectly honest with you, I didnft want to give —

24

to you bastards that's trying to kill me.

25

Q

talk

So you just, sort of in general, didn!t want to have

Addendum G

Not Reported in P.2d
2000UTApp56
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33249387 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

Page 1

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY, Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v.
Mi RANCHITA dba Guadalahara Grill; and Manuel
T. Armenta, as guarantor,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 990151-CA.
March 2, 2000.
Montivel A. Burke, IL Orem, for appellants.
Bryan W. Cannon and John R. Riley, Sandy, for
appellee.

Before JACKSON. BENCH, and BILLINGS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official
Publication)

As to his attorneys, any negligent behavior by the
attorneys "is attributable to [Armenta] through
principles of agency." Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d
1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). Amenta's claim-that his
attorneys' negligent behavior prejudiced the result of
the case-falls under Rule 60(b)(1). See Lincoln
Benefit. 838 P.2d at 675. Rule 60(b)(6) "may not be
resorted to for relief when the ground asserted for
relief falls within subparagraph 1" of Rule 60(b).
Russell 681 P.2d at 1195. Thus, the trial court
correctly concluded that Armenta's motion falls under
Rule 60(b)(1).
The record reveals only two instances when Federal
Financial served papers in what might be considered
an irregular fashion. However, both these instances
were harmless. In the first instance, Federal Financial
served the Motion for Summary Judgment on Chacon
more than a month after she had withdrawn as
Armenta's counsel. Nonetheless, Armenta responded
to that motion just a few weeks later, indicating that
he did receive the motion in a timely fashion. In the
second instance, Federal Financial served the court's
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Russell more
than two months after he withdrew as Armenta's
counsel. However, several weeks earlier, the court
itself served a minute entry on Armenta at the 4133
South 2200 West address, indicating that summary
judgment had been granted to Federal Financial.
TFN21

JACKSON.
*1 Appellants (hereafter Armenta) challenge the trial
court's denial of their Motion to Vacate Judgment.
We affirm.
Whether the trial court rightly concluded that
Armenta's motion falls under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(1) rather than Rule 60(b)(6) is a
question of law that we review for correctness. See
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. S. Properties,
838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Armenta
contends that both his attorneys and Federal Financial
failed to serve him properly with pleadings. ["FN 11

FN1. In connection with this argument,
Armenta contends he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. However, "ineffective
assistance of counsel is a[S]ixth Amendment
right limited to criminal law." Richins v.
Delbert Chipmcm & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382,
386n.2(UtahCt.App.l991).

FN2. There is no indication in the record
what relation this address has to Armenta.
We can infer, however, that it was a valid
address to make contact with Armenta, as it
was first used by his attorney Russell. Also,
Federal Financial mailed the Notice of Entry
of Judgment to Armenta at that address, by
certified mail, and the record gives no
indication that the Notice of Entry of
Judgment was returned as undeliverable.

Armenta also complains that Federal Financial
should have served him only at his home or business
address. He cites no authority mandating this result,
nor do we perceive any good reason to follow the
rule he suggests. In fact, during those times that
Armenta was represented by counsel, Federal
Financial was required to serve him through that
counsel. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1) (stating when
party is represented by counsel, "service shall be
made upon the attorney unless service upon the party
is ordered by the court" (emphasis added)).
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Our review of the record and the applicable law
persuades us that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Armenta's Motion to
Vacate Judgment. [FN3] The Motion was filed on
November 16, 1998, more than three months after the
order from which Armenta appealed. Thus,
Armenta's motion was untimely. See Utah R.Civ.P.
60(b)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
denial of Armenta's Motion to Vacate.
FN3. Armenta argues we should err on the
side of affording him a foil opportunity to
present his argument. However, " '[t]he rule
that the courts will incline towards granting
relief to a party, who has not had the
opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily
applied at the trial court level....' " Heath v.
Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979)
(quoting Airkem Inlermountain, Inc. v.
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 68. 513 P.2d 429,
431(1973)).
BENCH and BILLINGS. JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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